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Abstract: 
Title: Effects of Basel III announcements on European bank business models 
Author: Francisco Gomes Pereira 
The Basel regulation put forth by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) is an 
ambitious endeavor that aims at regulating the banking industry worldwide. The Basel III 
accord introduced in 2010 is the latest iteration of this effort. Implementation of Basel III is 
well underway today and programmed to take full effect in 2019. The criticism towards Basel 
III is mainly pointed towards the negative impact it could have on the economy and the prof-
itability of banking institutions. In addition, the impacts on different banking business models 
could be heterogeneous, benefitting some models more than others. The main question this 
thesis tries to answer is if wealth effects on European exchange traded banks brought by Ba-
sel III will be negative and if different business models will be impacted differently. To an-
swer this question a group of European banks were selected. Bank business models were as-
signed using the k-means clustering algorithm where banks are clustered into traditional vs. 
non-traditional categories depending on the asset and liability structure of the balance sheet. 
An event study is then conducted to measure the wealth effects caused by the introduction of 
Basel III on an aggregate level and by business model. The event studies are conducted on six 
key dates from press releases by the BCBS to better capture the full effects of Basel III. Last-
ly, a regression model is used to check whether there is any relationship between the abnor-
mal returns on the pre-specified event dates and bank business models. This thesis finds that 
impacts on different event dates were not homogenous: some resulted in positive abnormal 
returns and some negative therefore it was not possible to conclude if the impact of Basel III 
was negative on European exchange traded banks. From the results, it was not possible to 
conclude if any business model is impacted more or less severely by Basel III. The results 
suggest that there are more dynamics at play that could influence the value of exchange trad-
ed European banks. 
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1 - Introduction 
 
The banking industry is of vital importance for a healthy and thriving economy. In its 
most traditional form, banks provide liquidity, grant credit, and offer deposit and transaction 
services that cater to both individuals and businesses alike. Financial institutions play a cen-
tral role in the economy, so it is understandable why crises in the financial system can be so 
devastating for the economy. Unfortunately, financial crises are not uncommon events. In the 
past, financial crises were associated with bank runs and were arguably the most feared 
events by bankers. Today such events have become scant mostly owing to government depos-
it guarantees and a bigger emphasis by regulators on depositor safety. Today’s regulation, 
namely the Basel accords, has two main objectives. The first objective is focused towards 
building up the resilience of the banking industry by increasing capital requirements, so 
banks are adequately capitalized to resist financial stress and avoid potential spillovers into 
the real economy. The second objective is focused on designing homogenous regulation to 
maintain a level playing field in the financial industry worldwide and erase any potential ad-
vantages that could arise from geographic location.  
The financial industry changed dramatically in the last 30 years, becoming more com-
plex and interconnected at a worldwide scale. As the financial system evolves, new risks arise, 
and financial crisis are manifested in different ways. The financial crisis of 2007 is proof of 
how unsupervised financial innovation can backfire and severely damage the world economy. 
In the US, the subprime crisis is considered the deepest recession since the great depression 
of 1929. It is in the interest of everyone that crisis events do not happen in the future. Conse-
quently, the Basel III regulatory framework was the response designed by the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to this latest crisis. The new Basel III regulatory frame-
work builds on the previous Basel II and Basel I frameworks. The main contributions from 
the introduction of Basel III are stricter capital requirements and the introduction of liquidity 
requirements, respectively the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding 
Ratio (NSFR). BCBS main objective remains static with each new iteration of the Basel ac-
cord which can be summarized as promoting the resilience of banking institutions to increase 
stability in the financial system at a worldwide scale. It is widely agreed that a global regula-
tory framework is necessary therefore an accord such as the Basel III is not just desirable but 
also necessary. Basel III is the most comprehensive and wide-reaching effort undertaken in 
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banking regulation to this day. Despite its implementation being well underway in a large 
scale today, there is still criticism about certain components of the framework which are wel-
comed to devise a yet better Basel IV in the future. 
 As mentioned, Basel III does not come without its critics. After the Basel III an-
nouncement, criticism soon followed via reports from respectable institutions and academic 
researchers. One of the main arguments against the current Basel framework is that to build 
up capital ratios, a lot of additional capital will be needed that could reduce credit availability 
and/or increase the cost of credit (KPMG, 2011). It is estimated that banks’ return on equity 
(ROE) will suffer a reduction of as much as 4% on average for European banks 
(McKinsey&Company, 2010). Other critics say that Basel III will have a negative effect on 
the competitiveness, profitability, and efficiency of banks, as well as the complexity of the 
regulation and the high costs of implementation could also pose a problem. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of capital ratios is being contested. This is very problematic because capital 
ratios are one of the core devices used by the BCBS. Some argue that capital ratios are not 
being effective because it is common for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage (Balthazar, 
2006) (Ayadi, et al., 2012).  
It is also argued that Basel III does not lay an even playing field as different types of 
banks will be impacted differently. A common theme in the criticism is that different bank 
business models will be impacted differently, with retail banks being affected the least and 
trading businesses being affected the most (McKinsey&Company, 2010). Provided that the 
regulatory requirements of Basel III are transversal to all banks, it is reasonable to assume 
that certain bank business models will adapt better than others because of their structure and 
overall strategy. The introduction of liquidity regulation in Basel III, namely the NSFR, will 
put pressure on the less-traditional liquidity structures. The impact will also be heterogeneous 
among models because the institutions that currently have low capital ratios could face larger 
difficulties raising capital (McKinsey&Company, 2010).  
 Against this backdrop, one of the efforts put forth by this thesis will be to understand 
the impact Basel III announcements had on different banking business-models. In line with 
the suggestion made by (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017) and (Ayadi, et al., 2011), a “one-
size-fits-all” type of regulation might be too generalist and does not address relevant risks 
within certain institutions. Likewise, the Basel regulatory framework might be imposing too 
strict requirements on certain business models.  
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This thesis is an effort at answering the following two questions: 
Do the Basel III announcements have a negative impact on the firm value of European 
banks?  
Do the Basel III announcements impact banks differently depending on the business model?  
By researching the above questions, this thesis will try to understand if a one-size-fits-
all regulatory framework is too generalist and if regulatory requirements should take into 
consideration the business models of banks. 
The classification of business models will be executed based on the work done by 
(Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017). Their study identifies bank business models using a port-
folio approach which consists of analyzing the balance sheet structure and categorize banks 
based on the combination of assets and liabilities. The categorization of earning assets and 
funding liabilities will be made in a traditional vs. non-traditional approach. The components 
of the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet will be classified as a ratio of loans to 
customers as a percentage of total earning assets and deposits as a percentage of total funding 
liabilities, which gives four possible business models. Table 1 shows the business models 
classification proposed. The classification exercise will be conducted using a cluster analysis 
similar to the one used in the study of (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017). 
Table 1.1 – Business model identification matrix 
Cluster Model Asset Structure Liability Funding Structure 
C1 Model 1 Traditional Asset structure Traditional funding structure 
C2 Model 2 Non traditional asset structure Traditional funding Structure 
C3 Model 3 Traditional Assets Non Traditional funding Structure 
C4 Model 4 Non Traditional Asset Structure Non Traditional funding Structure 
 
Because of the central role banking institutions play in the real economy and the large 
economic and social costs associated with financial crises, the study of bank viability is rele-
vant to understand the stability of the banking system during favorable and unfavorable eco-
nomic periods. Because of the increased complexity and interconnectedness of banks today, 
more research is needed to understand the institutions of today. The importance to further 
study this topic is captured in (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017) in the following quote: 
“Given the large heterogeneity between recent banking business models, in fact, we know 
very little about the effect of banking models on bank profitability and risk.” 
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Given the importance of credit intermediation in the real economy as well as other 
banking services, it is desirable to reduce the possibility of failure, especially in systemically 
important institutions, which could amplify the severity of the economic cycle. 
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2 - The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision and the 
Basel accords 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is the entity that publishes the 
Basel accords. The Basel accords are a set of banking regulation recommendations issued 
with the primary goal of improving financial stability by lowering the likelihood of failure 
and erasing potential competitive advantages in international banking arising from differ-
ences in regulation. Financial globalization is a current reality and therefore it becomes in-
creasingly important the promotion and adoption of homogenous regulation through common 
agreements in order to remove any competitive inequalities that could arise from differences 
in national regulations. 
  The BCBS was initially comprised by the central bank governors of the G-10 nations 
but its intent since inception has always been for the regulations to be adopted by all regula-
tors in countries that have banks with an international presence. In later amendments to the 
Basel accords, more specifically beginning in 1996, supervisors from non G-10 countries 
became involved in the drafting of the Basel accords (BCBS, 2016). Despite being only rec-
ommendations, the policies drafted in the Basel accords were adopted and enforced by most 
regulatory bodies in many countries. As of today, the Basel accords have been established 
since 1988 and nations and banks alike continue to make efforts to comply with its recom-
mendations. 
2.1 - Basel Regulation 
!
2.1.1 - Basel I 
The first Basel accord was made public through the publication called “International 
convergence of capital measurement and capital standards” in July 1988. The paper was 
written and agreed by all the G10 central bank governors. The accord was considered a suc-
cess and a step in the right direction regarding regulation. The measures presented in the ac-
cord became widely accepted by all countries with active international banks by year-end 
1992 (BCBS, 2016). It is important to note that the Basel Committee counts on the regulatory 
and enforcing bodies of each country to enforce the agreement. The committee does not have 
judicial power over any country and the regulations presented in the document are only sug-
gestions. However, since the beginning, it was agreed that the 10 nations that designed the 
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accord would enforce it in their respective countries acting as role models for other nations. It 
was expected by the committee that many other national authorities that govern international 
banking institutions would follow suit and enforce Basel in their countries. 
Basel I introduced many changes in the banking industry. Arguably, one of the most 
important contributions was the introduction of capital ratios and the criteria for the classifi-
cation of capital in which it defined what constitutes Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. It introduced 
the risk weighting system which imposed a minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets, 
also known as target standard ratio of 8%, of which at least 4% needs to be comprised of Ti-
er-1 capital. Tier 1 capital is high quality capital and it is comprised of paid-up share capital 
or common stock and disclosed reserves (BCBS, 1988). Tier 2 capital is comprised of Undis-
closed reserves, asset revaluation reserves, general provisions/general loan-loss reserves, Hy-
brid (debt/equity) capital instruments and subordinated debt (BCBS, 1988). The riskiness 
classification of assets and their coverage ratios were grouped into five categories, 0%, 10%, 
20%, 50%, and 100% to determine the capital adequacy ratio (BCBS, 1988). In appendix 1, it 
can be found the matrix for the risk weights by category taken from the Basel I accord. Basel 
I also included in the document the transition and implementation period and expectations. 
Much of the criticism of Basel I stems from the fact that the framework only address-
es credit risk and other risks inherent to the banking activity are not included such as opera-
tional risk, interest rate risk, etc. Later amendments were introduced after the first publication 
of Basel I to include other risks. For example, in January 1996 an amendment was issued 
altering the framework to include market risk (BCBS, 2016). In addition, the risk weight sys-
tem has proven to not be bullet proof because institutions were able to engage into what is 
commonly called regulatory arbitrage (Ayadi, et al., 2012) (Balthazar, 2006). 
2.1.2 - Basel II 
The introduction of Basel II constituted a big change to the Basel framework. Basel II 
introduced the three-pillar system, which is also central to Basel III. The main objective of 
the accord and the BCBS remained static, which consisted of further strengthening the stabil-
ity of the international banking system and eliminating potential competitive inequalities be-
tween internationally active banks. Financial regulation is a continuous process and it is ex-
pected that amendments and adaptations are introduced, so criticism is welcomed to devise 
yet better regulation. A good portion of Basel I was kept in Basel II. The minimum capital 
requirement of 8% introduced in Basel I is maintained. Also, there are not big changes in the 
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definition of capital. The calculation of the risk weighted assets (RWA) changed because of 
the introduction of operational risk into the formula.  
As mentioned, the Basel II introduced the three pillar framework. Basel II framework 
is comprised of: Pillar I – Minimum Capital Requirements; Pillar II – supervisory review 
process; and Pillar III – Market discipline. The 3 pillars will be briefly described in the fol-
lowing subsections.  
2.1.2.1 - Pilar I – Minimum Capital requirements 
The first pillar under Basel II is the most extensive of the three. The first pillar defines 
and determines the minimum capital requirements banks must hold. This was an effort to 
further expand the rules set out in the first Basel accord (BCBS, 2016). The main aim of the 
Pillar I was to improve the capability of banks to foresee risks and improve their loss absor-
bency to withstand periods of financial stress. The definition of eligible regulatory capital 
remained the same as outlined in Basel I and the subsequent publication on the 27 of October 
1998 (BCBS, 2004). The first pillar addressed three types of risk: Credit risk, operational risk, 
and market risk, which will be briefly described below. 
2.1.2.1.1 - Credit risk 
Basel II allows banks to choose between 3 methodologies for estimating credit re-
quirements to cover credit risk. Banks can use the standardized approach, or the internal rat-
ings based approach (IRB), or the advanced internal ratings based approach (BCBS, 2004). 
The difference between the standardized approach and the IRB approach is that the IRB al-
lows banks to develop their own models for estimating probability of default. Under the ad-
vanced IRB approach, Basel allows banks to make their own estimations regarding probabil-
ity of default, exposure at default, loss given default, and the maturity of the effective maturi-
ty. Supervisory approval is needed before banks can use the IRB approach or the advanced 
IRB approach.  
2.1.2.1.2 - Credit risk, the standardized approach: 
The standardized approach remains similar to what was introduced in the Basel I 
framework, in which the capital needed to cover credit risk will be determined by risk 
weights attributed to each asset exposure.  
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2.1.2.1.3 - Credit risk the internal ratings based approach (IRB): 
The IRB approach is a method introduced in the Basel II accord and gives a higher 
degree of freedom to financial institutions to determine the required amount of capital needed 
to cover credit risk. Under the IRB method, there are four risk components to determine the 
risk weights to each asset. Probability of default (PD), Loss given default (LGD), Exposure at 
default (EAD), Effective maturity (M). The IRB approach can be further defined into basic 
IRB and advanced IRB. The difference between the IRB and the advanced IRB is based on 
the number of variables the banks can compute internally. While the standard IRB allows 
banks to determine the PD (Probability of default) under the advanced IRB, banks can deter-
mine all 4 variables (PD, LGD, EAD, M). However, the data needed to determine all the pa-
rameters is quite extensive, so supervisory authorization is needed. The justification for the 
introduction of the IRB is that banks have more information on the value of their assets, so 
they can make better judgments regarding the true riskiness of those assets. According to 
(Balthazar, 2006), recent research on credit risk management allowed more sophisticated 
banks to develop and handle risk reliably and better than the simpler Basel I capital require-
ment framework. However, not all institutions have the same level of sophistication, so it 
could happen that some institutions might not have the means to compute these variables in-
ternally. This can also be a disadvantage to the less sophisticated institutions as larger instruc-
tions under the advanced IRB approach could understate their risks and therefore needing less 
regulatory capital.  
2.1.2.1.4 - Operational risk 
The inclusion of minimum capital requirements to cover operational risk was a new 
addition to the Basel II framework. Operational risk is defined by the Basel II consultative 
paper from 2004 as follows: “Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. This 
definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk.” (BCBS, 2004). 
Operational risk can result in large losses for an organization therefore it is appropriate to 
include operational risk in the Basel framework. 
Under Basel II, three approaches are provided to calculate the amount of capital need-
ed to cover operational risk with varying levels of sophistication. Banks that have a higher 
operational risk profile are expected to implement more advanced measures to calculate oper-
ational risk. Banks can also use varying methods for some parts of the business. Basel II in-
cludes the qualifying criteria to determine which approach each bank should use. The three 
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approaches by increasing level of complexity are: The Basic indicator approach, the standard-
ized approach, and the advanced measurement approaches (AMA).  
The basic indicator approach is the most basic indicator and according to the Basel II 
document it is described as follows:  
“Banks using the Basic Indicator Approach must hold capital for operational risk equal to 
the average over the previous three years of a fixed percentage (denoted alpha) of positive 
annual gross income.” (BCBS, 2004) 
Under the standardized approach, the biggest difference between the basic indicator 
approach is that the standardized approach differentiates between business lines within the 
bank and assigns weights to each operational section. Crucially for this thesis, this could be 
seen as differentiating between business models, which is an argument that supports the as-
sumption that business models have different risks and regulation should adapt to different 
strategies. However, its impact in this case is small because operational risk is a small portion 
of total regulatory capital. According to the Basel II document, the standardized approach can 
be described as follows:  
“Within each business line, gross income is a broad indicator that serves as a proxy for the 
scale of business operations and thus the likely scale of operational risk exposure within each 
of these business lines. The capital charge for each business line is calculated by multiplying 
gross income by a factor (denoted beta) assigned to that business line. Beta serves as a proxy 
for the industry-wide relationship between the operational risk loss experience for a given 
business line and the aggregate level of gross income for that business line.” (BCBS, 2004) 
The advanced measurement approach (AMA) is the most advanced approach of the 
three as it allows banks to use their own internal operational risk models. Due to its com-
plexity, it requires approval by national supervisors.  
According to the Basel II document “Under the AMA, the regulatory capital requirement will 
equal the risk measure generated by the bank’s internal operational risk measurement sys-
tem…””... Use of the AMA is subject to supervisory approval.” (BCBS, 2004)  
2.1.2.1.5 - Market risk 
The Basel II consultative paper defines market risk as follows:  
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“Market risk is defined as the risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising 
from movements in market prices.” (BCBS, 2006).  
The market risk section in Basel II covers a varied number of topics related to trading 
and managing risk in the trading book. It provides guidance on appropriate valuation practic-
es and methods for measuring market risk. The document presents the regulations and capital 
requirements for managing exposure from taking positions in interest rates, equities, foreign 
exchange, commodities, and options. The document outlines a section to each one of these 
asset classes. The agreement is essentially a guide for capital requirements and hedging rules 
for taking positions in these instruments. This will impose stricter rules on trading businesses 
of investment banks and the less sophisticated banks could be affected the most as they will 
have to develop stricter risk management methodologies compliant with the market risk sec-
tion of Basel II. This can also mean that the more investment oriented banks could be at a 
disadvantage as they are subjected to these new rules. 
2.1.2.2 - Pilar II – Supervisory review process  
The supervisory review process pillar puts forth the idea that Basel regulation does 
not exist solely to ensure that banks have the adequate capital needed to cover their risks but 
also recognizes that management should bear responsibility for risk management practices. 
Bank management should take an active role in promoting the monitoring of risks within 
their organizations and designing better risk management systems. With this change in men-
tality, the BCBS expects bank management to take an active role in risk management and not 
solely comply with capital requirements imposed on them. The pillar also intends to promote 
the dialogue between bank management and regulators. This section of the accord also stress-
es the fact that the supervisory bodies should continuously evaluate banks and pay more at-
tention to the banks that have bigger deficiencies. The pillar outlines four principles in the 
supervisory review process, which are include in appendix 1. (BCBS, 2006) 
2.1.2.3 - Pilar III – Market discipline 
The Pillar 3, market discipline, was also a new introduction to the Basel framework. BCBS 
describes the purpose of the third pillar as  
“To complement the minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review 
process (Pillar 2). The committee aims to encourage market discipline by developing a set of 
disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to assess key pieces of infor-
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mation on the scope of application, capital risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and 
hence the capital adequacy of the institution.” (BCBS, 2006) 
With this, the BCBS aims at improving the disclosure of information by institutions 
so it is easier to assess whether an institution is controlling its risks effectively and let market 
participants promote prudent behavior. According to the BCBS, pillar 3 wishes to achieve: 
“Effective use of disclosure as a lever to strengthen market discipline and encourage sound 
banking practices.” (BCBS, 2016). It is expected for the market to promote “good behavior” 
and this way encourage bank management to act this way. 
 
2.1.3 - Basel III 
The Basel III accord is the latest accord released by the BCBS. It builds on the previ-
ous Basel accords and subsequent amendments published after. Basel III continues to im-
prove around the 3 pillars introduced in Basel II. Advancements by Basel III include the 
strengthening of the capital ratios, more specifically the increase of Tier 1 ratio from 2% to 
4.5%, enhancing risk coverage, and the introduction of 2 liquidity ratios. The phase-in sched-
ule with the new capital requirements can be consulted in appendix 1. Liquidity requirements 
were not present in the previous accords, so this introduction is one of the fundamental 
changes from the previous publications (BCBS, 2010). The introduction of liquidity ratios 
was extensively discussed and published by the BCBS in the years leading up to the Basel III 
release, so its inclusion came to no surprise. The new liquidity ratios introduced in Basel III 
are the LCR (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) and the NSFR (Net Stable Funding Ratio).  
With the introduction of the liquidity coverage ratio the Basel Committee tries to de-
fine the qualification of liquid assets, so that bank’s assets remain liquid even during periods 
of economic stress. The introduction of the liquidity ratios in Basel III can be attributed, to a 
certain extent, to the liquidity drought experienced during the subprime crisis, more specifi-
cally following the bankruptcy of Lehman. After a thorough analysis, the committee found 
that banks did not have adequate practices regarding liquidity management which exacerbat-
ed the problem. Upon this assessment, the Committee found it necessary to include liquidity 
standards into the framework. The Committee also revised the definition of qualifying liquid 
assets subject to the overall requirement that such assets remain prudently liquid in periods of 
stress. The optimal level of liquid assets that banks should hold in the balance sheet is still an 
open discussion. (Bordeleau & Graham, 2010) make the case that banks profitability can be 
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improved by holding liquid assets to a certain level, though with diminishing returns, as at a 
certain point the gains halt.  
By introducing liquidity standards, the Committee intends to achieve two objectives.  
According to the Basel III consultative document, the first objective reads as follows: “Pro-
mote short-term resilience of a bank’s liquidity risk profile by ensuring that it has sufficient 
high-quality liquid assets.” (BCBS, 2010) This first objective is intended to be accomplished 
through the introduction of the LCR. The second objective is defined by the BCBS as fol-
lows: “Promote resilience over a longer time horizon by creating additional incentives for 
banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing basis.” 
(BCBS, 2010) This second objective is intended to be achieved through the NSFR.  
The goal of the LCR is to ensure that banks have the adequate level of high-quality 
liquid assets (HQLA) so that they can survive a liquidity stress scenario lasting 30 days 
(BCBS, 2010).  
Equation 2.3.1.1 – LCR (BCBS, 2010) 
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The introduction of the LCR was made on the first day of January of 2015 but its im-
plementation will be gradual to ensure that there is no abrupt disruption to banks operations. 
The minimum LCR requirements will be phased in as follows (BCBS, 2013): 
Table 2.3.1.1 - Phase-in introduction of the LCR (BCBS, 2013) 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Minimum 
LCR re-
quirement: 
60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
The NSFR was developed to promote medium- and long-term stable funding of banks 
and is an effort to limit the over reliance on short term funding sources such as wholesale 
funding. The NSFR is a ratio that “establishes a minimum acceptable amount of stable fund-
ing based on liquidity characteristics of an institution’s assets and activities over a one year 
horizon” (BCBS, 2010). The NSFR can be defined as the ratio that determines the amount of 
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stable funding available to an institution in relation to its required amount of funding. The 
ratio should always be maintained above 100%. The NSFR formula is included below (BCBS, 
2010): 
Equation 2.3.1.2 - NSFR 
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 The NSFR has proven to be difficult to implement, as of 2017 it is still being fine-
tuned. A press release from the 6 of October of 2017 by the BCBS allows national regulatory 
bodies discretion for the treatment of derivative liabilities. The standard factor proposed by 
Basel III is 20% of derivative liabilities. The BCBS allowed for this factor to be lowered 
down to 5% (BCBS, 2017).   
 
3 - Literature review 
!
The following section examines the academic literature on bank regulation, event studies and 
bank business models. 
 
3.1 - Bank business models, identification methods and results.  
!
This part of the thesis is devoted to reviewing the current literature regarding banking 
business models. This section includes an overview of the different methods used to classify 
business models as well as their findings. To summarize, the majority of studies reviewed in 
this section reach the conclusion that traditional forms of banking are more stable and less 
risky. These findings could have implications for regulation because all banks under Basel III 
are subject to the same capital and liquidity requirements. 
One obstacle when assigning business models to banks is that there is not a universal-
ly agreed standard procedure in academic literature. Each author follows its own definition 
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and criteria to better fit their study. Classifying banks can be useful for several purposes such 
as consistency among studies and a potential application in regulation. Banks diverge among 
each other significantly in many aspects. The variables that receive the most attention when 
differentiating bank strategies are funding strategies, asset composition, capitalization levels, 
income generating strategies (income vs. non-income), and ownership structure. Different 
types of banks have different risks inherent to their activity. However, some regulation is still 
written in a one-size-fits-all approach. Some authors suggest that taking business models into 
consideration when devising regulatory standards can bring added benefits to regulation 
(Ayadi, et al., 2012) (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017) (Mergaerts & Vennet, 2016). 
Regulators already recognize the importance of business models in managing the sus-
tainability of the banks. Starting at year end 2015, the ECB started conducting a forward-
looking evaluation of activities of banks and conducting a review called the SREP, short for 
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process. The ECB does an analysis on the sustainability 
of the strategy of every bank and sends them a report with recommendations (ECB, 2016). 
The course that regulation is taking in recent years suggests that more attention will be given 
to the business models of banks in the future. (Mergaerts & Vennet, 2016) share this opinion 
which is captured in the following quote from their study: 
“…These considerations imply that the application of prudential regulation should also re-
flect the heterogeneity of bank business model decisions. In this regard, supervisors are increasingly 
aware that business models matter for banks’ risk-return profiles. In the future, the Supervisory Re-
view and Evaluation Process (SREP) published by the European Banking Authority (EBA, 2014) will 
become the cornerstone of European bank supervision.” 
Cluster analysis is one method that can be used to classify bank business models. 
(Ayadi, et al., 2011) identified three business models based on the balance sheet structure 
using the Ward (1963) hierarchical clustering algorithm and the pseudo-F index to determine 
the number of clusters in the data. The three models identified by the authors were retail 
banks, investment banks and wholesale banks. They found that traditional banking business 
models, those that rely on customer deposits for funding and customer lending activity on the 
asset side of the balance sheet, are the least leveraged, are more stable during financial crisis 
and are less risky and performed relatively well. This conclusion is also supported by the 
studies of (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017), (Altunbas, et al., 2011) and (Mergaerts & 
Vennet, 2016). (Ayadi, et al., 2011) also concluded that wholesale banks fared worse in terms 
of profitability and are the riskiest due to low liquid assets and high volume of interbank 
%-!
!
funding. They also concluded that banks making up the investment model also rely on less 
stable funding and maintain low levels of loss-absorbing capital.  
(Mergaerts & Vennet, 2016) borrowed methods from various studies to assign busi-
ness models to the banks in their sample. Apart from financial variables that can be retrieved 
from the balance sheet and income statements, they believe that other variables such as types 
of clients, products and distribution channels should be taken into consideration. The authors 
used both direct and indirect classifications in their research. Direct classification are classifi-
cations given by a third party (e.g. Bankscope), and indirect classifications use financial vari-
ables to compute and determine business models, (e.g. Cluster analysis). The authors recog-
nize that each method has its flaws. Therefore they use multiple methods to assign business 
models. One of the main conclusions from this study is that traditional banks have better 
long-term performance than non-traditional banks. 
(Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017) used the k-medoid cluster analysis to classify bank 
business models. K-medoid cluster algorithm identifies clusters in the data by solving for the 
smallest Euclidian distance between variable points in the data. The clusters are actual data 
points in the sample, this way reducing the effect of outliers. The authors found 4 distinct 
business models, two within a traditional structure and two in a non-traditional structure. 
They argue that traditional banks are less systemically risky than non-traditional business 
models. They show that the riskiest business model in their sample was the investment bank 
model due to its low ratio of deposits on the liability portion of the balance sheet as the liabil-
ity structure of banks is the main driver of systemic risk (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017). 
If many banks have extensive short-term funding and the interest rate increases due to market 
illiquidity, this can seriously increase funding costs for these institutions. Further, according 
to their study, bank interconnectedness exacerbated the problem during the financial crisis. 
As the current trend is for banks to become increasingly connected, this problem is not likely 
to disappear soon. (van Oordt & Zhou, 2014) also reached the same conclusion in their study 
regarding systemic risk. Systemic risk, they argue, is composed of bank specific tail risk and 
interconnectedness. 
In a different study, (Altunbas, et al., 2011) reached the conclusion that a stronger cus-
tomer deposit base is more effective at reducing bank distress. This result is stronger for risk-
ier institutions. A market base type funding is correlated with higher likelihood of distress. 
The authors argue that banks with higher capital ratios have a better trade-off between risk 
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and profitability. They also argue that banks with a larger deposit base decrease interest ex-
pense and increase interest income. Banks that have a more traditional balance sheet, which 
means more customer deposits as funding and more loans as assets, have more tail risk but 
less exposure to systemic risk. This can be explained by the lower reliance on short-term 
funding which could substantially increase their funding costs during periods of liquidity 
scarcity. This conclusion is similar with (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017), quoting their 
study:  
“Systemic risk is related to bank funding structure and individual risk seems to be linked to 
it's asset structure.”  
(Beltratti & Stulz, 2012) investigated why banks performed so poorly during the fi-
nancial crisis. In agreement with the other research studies present in this section, they found 
that banks that relied on short-term funding performed poorly during the crisis. Their study 
showed that banks that had more Tier-1 capital and relied on deposits for funding performed 
better during the crisis.  
From this brief academic review, the consensus seems to indicate that a traditional 
structure seems to be linked to bank stability and to a better risk return profile. The funding 
structure seems to be an important variable for stability while the asset side of the balance 
sheet is important to ensure the bank is financially healthy. Upon the revision of these studies 
one common theme seems to take form, which is that traditional forms of banking seem to be 
more stable than less traditional forms of banking. This common theme is the reason behind 
the classification of banks in this study. This study assigns two variables to each bank in the 
sample: percentage of loans to customers of total earning assets and percentage of deposits of 
total funding liabilities. With these two variables, a cluster algorithm is used to differentiate 
between traditional and non-traditional models. The full description of the methodology used 
will be further discussed in the methodology section.  
 
3.2 - Literature review of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
and event studies  
One method available to conduct an assessment on the impact of Basel III will have 
on banks is by conducting an event study to capture the market reaction to the announcement 
concerning Basel III. To conduct an event study, the assumption of efficient markets is neces-
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sary. According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) developed by Professor Eugene 
Fama, a market is said to be efficient if security prices reflect all available information and 
therefore it is not possible for traders to consistently profit on this information in the long-run 
(Fama, 1970).  
According to the EMH, there are 3 forms of market efficiency. Weak-form efficiency, 
semi-strong form efficiency, and strong-form efficiency. Weak-form efficiency states that 
traders cannot earn excess returns based on the analysis of past prices. The semi-strong-form 
efficiency is based on the idea that the market quickly incorporates all available public infor-
mation, so it is not possible for traders to profit by acting on this information. The strong-
form efficiency is the idea that market prices reflect all public and private information (Fama, 
1970). 
The EMH does not go without critics. For example, (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993), ar-
gue that a portfolio consisting of buying recent winner and selling recent losers will yield a 
positive return. In their own words, “trading strategies that buy past winners and sell past 
losers realize significant abnormal returns over 1965 to 1989 period” (Jegadeesh & Titman, 
1993). This study goes against the weak-form market efficiency theory which argues that 
profits cannot be constantly made based on decisions made based on past prices. (De Bondt 
& Thaler, 1985) challenge the hypothesis of semi-strong form efficiency by showing that a 
“contrarian” portfolio building approach can yield positive returns. Their research stems from 
the idea that people tend to overreact to news and the same can be applied to the stock market. 
They concluded in their study in 1985 that “consistent with the predictions of the overreac-
tion hypothesis, portfolios of prior losers are found to outperform prior winners” (De Bondt 
& Thaler, 1985). Another issue to keep in mind is that information asymmetries might be 
present in thinly traded stocks which could result in mispriced securities. 
Despite the criticism of Fama's EMH theory, this study assumes the market is semi-
strong efficient. Given this assumption, an event study can provide insight regarding the 
wealth effects caused by the introduction of Basel III. (Eyssell & Arshadi, 1990) and (Copper, 
et al., 1991) conducted event studies on the announcements of Basel I. Both studies conclud-
ed that the market reacted adversely to the announcement of the Basel I accord, which is an 
indication that market participants expect lower bank returns in the future with the implemen-
tation of new capital requirements introduced in 1988. This does not mean that future reac-
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tions to new iterations of the Basel accord will be negative. Basel III, for instance, is a more 
comprehensive accord than Basel I.  
 
3.3 - Bank profitability and the impact of Basel 
!
Understanding bank profitability is important not just for shareholders, credit provid-
ers, and bank managers, but also for financial regulators. Regulation can have an impact on 
the profitability and of financial institutions and such issues should be looked at because fi-
nancially healthy banks can contribute to the stability of the banking industry. Furthermore, if 
banks are profitable, they can build up capital ratios with less effort, which is a desirable out-
come by regulators. Inversely, if banks have losses, this can eat up capital making it harder 
for banks to comply with regulatory capital requirements.  
3.3.1 - General bank profitability 
!
There are many variables that can influence bank profitability. It could prove useful to 
understand these variables and dynamics. A common and widely accepted predictor of bank 
profitability is GDP. (Gambacorta & Albertazzi, 2009) concluded that banks' profits are pro-
cylical, as profits are positively correlated with GDP. They justify their finding by explaining 
that income is affected by a growing economy via increased interest income and the quality 
of the strengthening of the credit portfolio. This conclusion is intuitive because due to the 
better economic conditions there could be less defaults on loans outstanding and therefore 
loan loss provisions are reduced. The preceding conclusion is important when testing for 
bank performance as this macroeconomic variable should be controlled for when testing for 
profitability (Athanasoglou, et al., 2008). When analyzing bank performance, it should be 
noted the economic context in which profits were made. 
(Molyneux & Thornton, 1992) tested several variables against bank profitability. 
These researchers found a statistically significant correlation between European banks return 
on capital and concentration. They also found a positive correlation between return on capital 
and nominal interest rates which, according to the authors, can be understood as a capital 
scarcity proxy. (Molyneux & Thornton, 1992) found a positive relationship between govern-
ment ownership and return on capital, which was not an expected conclusion as it goes 
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against the conventional belief that government run enterprises fair worse than privately run 
ones. Challenging the previous conclusion, (Athanasoglou, et al., 2008) find that ownership 
structure is not a good predictor of bank profitability. Another conclusion also reached by 
(Molyneux & Thornton, 1992) emphasize the importance of operational expenses when ex-
plaining bank performance, making the case for the importance of managerial expertise when 
explaining bank profitability. Understanding bank profitability is a complex topic and as 
showed by these studies, there are several variables that can explain bank profitability and 
there is not a wide consensus on the results. 
Although most of these variables will not be the scope of this thesis, it is relevant to 
note that extensive studies regarding bank profitability have been conducted and many poten-
tial variables other than capital and liquidity standards can impact profitability. 
3.3.2 - Impact of Basel on the Real Economy 
!
(Cosimano & Hakura, 2011) and (Angelini, et al., 2011) argue that the Basel regula-
tions will impact the real economy through reduced loans underwritten by banks and in-
creased interest rates. (Cosimano & Hakura, 2011) argue that Basel III will result in the 
world's largest banks to increase their lending rate by an average of 0.16% which would in 
turn reduce loan growth by 1.3%. This increase was based on the assumption that these banks 
will need to increase, on average, their equity-to-asset ratio by 1.3% to achieve the equity to 
comply with new Basel III risk-weighted asset ratios. Provided the banks in their sample will 
pay higher financing costs than if they were financed through debt, they concluded that the 
Modigliani and Miller assumptions did not apply for the sample of banks in their study. In 
addition, they show that maintaining an estimated elasticity of loan demand with respect to 
the loan rate of 0.33% for the group of largest banks, loan growth will decline by 1.3% in the 
long run, and thus could negatively impact the real economy (Cosimano & Hakura, 2011). 
However, not everyone is of the same opinion about the negative impacts of Basel III.  
(Admati, et al., 2013) defends the idea that increased equity requirements for banks will not 
have adverse impacts. (Admati, et al., 2013) defend the idea that equity is not expensive for 
banks and better capitalized banks can bring large benefits both for the banking institutions 
and for the economy. Other researchers such as (Berger & Bowman, 2013) also argue that 
higher capital enhances the capacity of institutions to absorb financial shocks and could even 
have a positive effect on ROE. 
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3.3.3 - Impact of Basel regulation on Bank Profitability. Do better capital-
ized banks have better profitability? 
!
Basel accords are based on the notion that banks should be better capitalized to better 
withstand turbulent periods and maintain stability. Better capitalized banks will be more resil-
ient to financial stress, there is not much resistance against this assumption. The bigger ques-
tion today is centered on whether regulatory capital requirements costs will outweigh the 
benefits. For example, issues such as regulatory arbitrage being prevalent should be taken 
into consideration otherwise it defeats the purpose of applying capital requirements (Ayadi, et 
al., 2012). Popular believe would make us think that holding more capital translates in costs 
for banks however, studies like (Berger & Bowman, 2013) support the efforts undertaken by 
Basel. They reach the conclusion that holding more capital translates in higher survival prob-
abilities during a crisis. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, they also concluded that higher 
capital enhances ROE of small banks during all period of the economic cycle while it en-
hances ROE for medium and large size banks during bank crisis and market crisis (Berger & 
Bowman, 2013). Other studies such as (Altunbas, et al., 2011) would agree with the higher 
survival probability conclusion as they argue that undercapitalization was one of the explana-
tions for the severity of the financial crisis of 2007. (Athanasoglou, et al., 2008) also find that 
capital and credit risk are important variables when explaining bank profitability. These stud-
ies could be interpreted as strong arguments supporting the measures proposed in the Basel 
regulations. 
On the other hand, (Eyssell & Arshadi, 1990) and (Copper, et al., 1991) conducted 
event studies on the announcements of Basel I with the opposite conclusion. The announce-
ment had a negative impact on the stock returns which could mean the banks in the sample 
will generate lower returns in the future. 
(Demirguc-Kunt, et al., 2010) study is an effort to understand if market participants 
favored better capitalized banks by measuring stock returns. They concluded that stock re-
turns were not affected by differences in risk adjusted capital ratios between banks during 
stable economic periods. However, during the crisis, the stock returns of large banks were 
more sensitive to the leverage ratio than the risk adjusted capital ratio. One explanation could 
be that market participants understand that capital requirements can be easily manipulated by 
financial institutions, a phenomenon called regulatory arbitrage. This could also be explained 
by the conclusions by (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017) and (Altunbas, et al., 2011) that 
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market base type funding is correlated with higher likelihood of distress. There was also an 
association with higher quality Tier 1 capital and stock returns, which shows that market par-
ticipants value better quality capital buffers (Demirguc-Kunt, et al., 2010).This conclusion 
supports the efforts towards better capital requirements and the introduction of leverage ratios. 
According to the study, these measures could help banks during periods of financial stress. 
This can also be an argument of the introduction of the counter cyclical capital buffer in Ba-
sel III. 
3.3.5 - How liquidity ratios impact profitability 
!
(Bordeleau & Graham, 2010) find that profitability is improved for banks that hold a 
certain level of liquid assets, however the gains can be reversed if the amount of liquid assets 
increases past a certain threshold. It can be beneficial to hold highly liquid assets but only to a 
certain extent. According to the authors:  
“… the opportunity cost of holding low-return assets eventually outweighs the benefit of any 
increase in the bank’s liquidity resiliency as perceived by the funding markets.”  
The question is now centered in how much liquid assets the banks should hold. It 
turns out that this ratio is not simple to determine, as the relationship between liquid assets 
and profitability depends on the bank business model (Bordeleau & Graham, 2010). They 
argue that traditional bank business models, comprised mostly of deposit and loans, optimize 
profits with lower levels of liquid assets. On the other hand, less traditional banking models, 
more specifically banks that engage in more market related activities, benefit more by hold-
ing more liquid assets (Bordeleau & Graham, 2010). Their study suggests the need to adjust 
liquidity ratios based on the activity of each bank. On the other hand, (Mergaerts & Vennet, 
2016) reached the conclusion that a high NSFR reduces the profitability of non-traditional 
banks and increases the stability of more retail oriented banks. 
(Molyneux & Thornton, 1992) stated the following in their study: 
“In the case of liquidity ratios, we find a weak inverse relationship with profitability which is 
also to be expected as liquidity holdings (particularly those imposed by the authorities) rep-
resent a cost to the bank” 
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According to (Molyneux & Thornton, 1992) the introduction of the LCR and NSFR 
will have a negative impact in the value of the banks, however a weak impact. 
4 - Methodology and results 
4.1 - Sample selection 
The sample in this study is comprised of exchange traded European banks. The sam-
ple was selected by retrieving data from the list of European banks from the Thompson Reu-
ters Eikon database. The balance sheet data was also retrieved from Reuters Eikon and was 
used to analyze and assign a business model to each bank in the sample. The total return for 
all European bank stocks was retrieved to conduct the event study. The total return values 
retrieved take into account past dividends. After the initial extraction of the data, the sample 
was then narrowed down to accommodate for data availability. The final sample includes 173 
European banks in 2010. The list of banks in the sample can be consulted in appendix 2.  
4.2 - Banks business models’ methodology and result 
!
The k-means clustering algorithm was used to identify and assign business models to 
each bank. The k-means clustering method consists of clustering data points by minimizing 
the squared Euclidean distance between sample variables. Applying clustering methodology 
to identify bank business models has been previously done by (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 
2017), (Ayadi, et al., 2011), (Ayadi, et al., 2012) and (Roengpitya, et al., 2014). However, the 
clustering methods used by these studies differ between each other. (Hryckiewicz & 
Kozlowski, 2017) used the k-medoid algorithm with euclidean distance. (Ayadi, et al., 2011), 
(Ayadi, et al., 2012), and (Roengpitya, et al., 2014) on the other hand used a hierarchical 
clustering method to identify bank business models in their data. These authors used the 
Ward’s linkage clustering method and the Carlinsky Harabasz pseudo-F index to determine 
the number of clusters.  
This study used the k-means clustering algorithm, so the focus will be on this method. 
The k-means clustering method is similar to the k-medoid method used by (Hryckiewicz & 
Kozlowski, 2017). The difference between these two methods is that the k-medoid clustering 
algorithm uses actual data points in the sample as the clusters while the k-means cluster is a 
result of the average of the data points in the cluster. According to (Hryckiewicz & 
Kozlowski, 2017), k-medoid is a more robust clustering method as the cluster is an actual 
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existing point in the sample and therefore the result is less prone to the effect of outliers. The 
present study uses k-means due to data limitations.  
The formula for the k-means algorithms is as follows: 
 
Equation 4.2.1 – K-Means clustering algorithm Where J is the objective function, k is the number of clusters, 
n is the number of cases, c is the centroid for cluster j 
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The distinction between banking business models is based on the balance sheet com-
position of each bank, as in (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017). To accomplish this, balance 
sheet data was retrieved to identify all the lines that comprised the earning assets and funding 
liabilities for each bank. To determine the asset structure of each bank, the ratio of loans to 
entities other than banks to total earning assets was calculated. Similarly, for the liability 
structure, the ratio of deposits to total funding liabilities was calculated.  
 
Equation 4.2.2 - Ratio of loans to entities other than banks to total earning assets: 
(220+.R+841+480 D.'*,/2.+*.0/+=+=02.*+308.+3,/.>,/S2)*+,-.0,8/=/@.,220+2  
 
Equation 4.2.3 - Ratio of deposits to total funding liabilities 
'=,>=-=+=02.R+841+480 D. T0U*2=+2)*+,-.54/;=/@.-=,>=-=+=02 
By measuring these variables, it can be inferred the type of banking activity each bank 
engages in, i.e., whether it is more traditional or non-traditional. Each bank in the sample has 
these two variables assigned. Graph 4.2.1 shows a 2D graph with the sample distribution. 
The analysis in this study is different from that of (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 2017) 
in four points. First, their study combines deposits and short-term funding into one variable 
while in this study they are considered two distinct variables. Second, (Hryckiewicz & 
Kozlowski, 2017) include non-interest liabilities as a funding variable while this study omits 
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that variable because that variable was not present in the data collected. Three, this study cat-
egorizes banks using a traditional vs non-traditional approach while (Hryckiewicz & 
Kozlowski, 2017) uses more balance sheet variables as inputs in the clustering algorithm. 
And forth, this study uses the k-means clustering algorithm while (Hryckiewicz & Kozlowski, 
2017) used the k-medoid clustering algorithm. 
Limitations in this study include the fact that the sample only includes publicly listed 
banks. A second limitation is that the Thomson Reuters Eikon database only includes banks 
that are still operating as of 2017. Because of this, the study suffers from survivorship bias. 
The composition of banking business models in a specific year should be interpreted as the 
evolution of the current surviving banks and not the full profile of banking business models 
in that specific year. 
The computation of clusters was done using Matlab. The algorithm used was k-means 
with four clusters and squared Euclidean distance and 200 replicates. The k-means algorithm 
starts at random points, for this reason it was important to use many replicates in order to 
have consistent cluster results. Table 4.2.1 shows the business models identified and Table 
4.2.2 shows the cluster point, or centroids, obtained by running the k-means algorithm on 
data from 2010. Graph 4.2.2 shows the sample distribution graph where the centroids are 
marked with an X. Four business models were identified. Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, Model 
4.  
Model 1 consists mainly of traditional assets and has a traditional funding structure. 
Model 2 composition is mainly of non-traditional assets and has a traditional funding struc-
ture. Model 3 Consists mainly of traditional assets and has a non-traditional funding structure. 
Model 4 Consists mainly of non-traditional assets and has a non-traditional funding structure. 
In appendix 2 it is included the table with the list of banks and the assigned business model. 
Table 4.2.1 – Bank business models identified 
Cluster Model Model name Asset Structure Liability Funding Structure 
C1 Model 1 T/T Traditional Asset structure Traditional funding structure 
C2 Model 2 NT/T Non traditional asset structure Traditional funding Structure 
C3 Model 3 T/NT Traditional Assets Non Traditional funding Structure 
C4 Model 4 NT/NT Non Traditional Asset Structure Non Traditional funding Structure 
 
 
Table 4.2.2 – Cluster points, or centroids, based on the 2010 year-end balance sheet data. 
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Model % Traditional assets % Traditional liabilities 
Model 1 0.7516 0.8782 
Model 2 0.3095 0.8464 
Model 3 0.7256 0.5414 
Model 4 0.1280 0 
 
 
Graph 4.2.1 – Illustration of the sample distribution. It depicts the percentage of traditional assets and percentage of 
traditional liabilities for each bank in the sample in 2010. The X-axis represents the percentage of loans to customers 
of total earning assets. The Y-axis represents the percentage of deposits of total funding liabilities. 
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Graph 4.2.2 – Result obtained after running the k-means algorithm on balance sheet data from 2010. The X’s repre-
sent the clusters also called centroids. 
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4.3 - Event study methodology and results 
4.3.1 - Introduction  
According to (MacKinley, 1997)“using financial market data, an event study 
measures the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm.” According to (Kothari & 
Warner, 2007), event studies are useful because the magnitude of the abnormal returns can be 
a good indicator of the impact the announcement had on the return of the security, and there-
fore on the wealth effects on the firm. This research conducts an event study to assess the 
wealth impact of various Basel III announcements on European banks. Event studies can be 
used as alternatives to analysis based on accounting methods which can suffer from data ac-
curacy (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Compared with accounting methods, event studies can 
be simpler to compute and retrieve data and erase the possibility of accounting information 
being manipulated, (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
For an event study to be robust, several assumptions should be made. According to 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997), three assumptions should be met to design a robust event 
study. The first assumption is market efficiency. This assumption is based on Eugene Fama’s 
efficient market hypothesis and it assumes that market participants immediately take into 
account information released into the market, therefore stock prices are immediately adjusted. 
This is discussed in the literature review section above regarding the EMH. The second as-
sumption is that the event was unanticipated. This means that market participants did not 
know in advance the contents of the event. This assumption is hard to make, given that it is 
hard to assess the extent of information leakage before the announcement. Also, it is impossi-
ble to measure the degree to which market participants knew, or expected, the modifications 
announced. It is usually assumed that if no big price movements occur during the days pre-
ceding the event announcement, then we can infer that the event was unanticipated. The third 
assumption is confounding effects. This important assumption means that the effects on the 
stock prices are only due to the event under study and not due to other events that are taking 
place simultaneously. This is one of the reasons why event studies with short time windows 
are more robust as they isolate the effects of the announcement and avoid potential contami-
nation of other announcements with material information released around the same time. The 
present study uses daily returns because this way abnormal returns can be measured more 
precisely (Kothari & Warner, 2007). If the time window is larger, we are assuming that mar-
kets are not efficient, meaning that market participants take longer to incorporate new infor-
mation into stock prices, increasing the possibility that a different event is contaminating our 
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event study. According to (Kothari & Warner, 2007), more confidence can be placed in short-
horizon tests than long-horizon.  
In this thesis, the time windows used are [0], [-1,+1] and [-3,+3]. The [0] time win-
dow only considers stock price movements on the day of the event. The [-1,+1] event win-
dow considers stock price movements the day preceding the event, the event day and the fol-
lowing day, giving more time for market participants to assimilate the information. Similarly, 
the [-3,+3] event window include 3 days before the event, the event day and three day after 
the event date, providing an even larger amount of time for market participants to assess the 
full extent and repercussion of the information contained in the announcement. The larger 
event windows have the benefit of considering the days preceding the event to capture any 
potential information leakage and gives traders more time to incorporate the information into 
the pricing. This can be a desired characteristic because some academics believe that stock 
prices can overreact to announcements, as showed for example in (Chopra, et al., 1992).  
 
4.3.2 - Event dates 
 
The dates chosen to assess the Basel III impact were the following: 
Event Date Description 
Event 1 30 March 2009 “Initiatives in response to the crisis by the Basel Committee” 
Event 2 17 Dec 2009 “Consultative proposals to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector announced by the Basel Committee.” 
Event 3 16 July 2010 “Progress on regulatory reform package: Basel committee press release.” Introduction of the countercyclical capital buffer proposal 
Event 4 26 July 2010 
“The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision reach broad 
agreement on Basel Committee capital and liquidity reform pack-
age.” 
Event 5 12 Sep 2010 “Group of governors and Head of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards” 
Event 6 16 Dec 2010 Basel III full rules text document with the new framework to be fully adopted by Jan 2019 released 
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A brief summary of the announcements are described. 
30 March 2009: 
 On the 30 of March 2009, the BCBS issued a press release in which it expressed the 
interest of the BCBS in expanding the current Basel II framework and make it more resilient 
considering the recent events brought by the crisis. The ideas put forth by the head of the 
BCBS to include in the regulatory framework are: 
-' More and higher quality capital requirements,  
-' Include requirements regarding trading book, securitization and derivatives. 
-' The introduction of a countercyclical capital buffer 
-' Liquidity buffers  
-' Better governance standards  
-' Greater transparency in banks portfolios. 
This new focus was sure to bring dramatic changes to the banking landscape and it 
could be argued that non-traditional banks were to be hit the hardest because a great deal of 
regulation was designed to put pressure on the trading book, securitization business, OTC 
derivatives, and funding sources motivated by the crisis of 2007. It is important to mention 
that no specific or quantifiable measures were presented, this was only an announcement that 
the BCBS will work towards implementing regulation in these areas. 
17 of December 2009: 
On the press release of 17th of December 2009, the BCBS communicated that during 
the meeting of 8 and 9 of December of 2009 they approved for consultation a package of 
proposals to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations. According to the press re-
lease, the consultation package was designed taking into consideration the lessons from the 
financial crisis and with the objective to promote a more resilient banking sector. The two 
documents comprising the consultation package are entitled “International framework for 
liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring – consultative document” and 
“Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector – consultative document.” The documents 
were only proposals and were still to be debated and approved, but they represented the main 
brushstrokes of what was to become Basel III. This press release is also significant because it 
further pushed for reforms in the trading businesses as it introduced rules for the trading book 
and increased capital requirements for exposures arising from derivatives and repo transac-
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tions to incentivize OTC derivatives to move into the exchanges. The document also intro-
duced operational risk reforms. One of the big announcements in the press release was the 
announcement of the inclusion of liquidity reforms (the LCR and the NSFR), which further 
consolidated the interest of the BCBS to integrate liquidity regulation and monitoring into the 
Basel framework. Regarding liquidity, the committee justifies their position by arguing that 
during the 2007 crisis many banks were not able to maintain adequate liquidity and this being 
a cause for the severity of the liquidity drought that occurred during the financial crisis. Quot-
ing the announcement “The crises illustrated how quickly and severely liquidity risks can 
crystallize and certain sources of funding can evaporate, compounding concerns related to 
the valuation of assets and capital adequacy” (BCBS, 2009). This press release will be rele-
vant to assess the wealth effects not just of the initial Basel III framework but also the fully 
drafted introduction of the liquidity ratios. These documents were the first that introduced the 
LCR and the NSFR ratios as liquidity metrics. It is also expected that trading businesses and 
therefore the banks with less traditional business models will be affected the most due to the 
introduction of rules regarding the trading book and strengthening of capital requirements 
regarding derivative exposures. 
16 July 2010: 
 On the 16 of July of 2010 the BCBS announced that the Basel III development was on 
track and introduced a new capital requirement, the countercyclical capital buffer. This was a 
new capital buffer on top on previously introduced capital requirements. This could pose ad-
ditional capital burden for banks. Assessing the wealth impact of this announcement could 
provide insight into the wealth effect the additional capital buffer will have.  
26 July 2010: 
 On the 26 of July 2010 the Governors and Heads of supervision reached a broad 
agreement regarding the capital and liquidity reform package. The main topics agreed on 
were the definition of capital, the treatment of counterparty risk, the leverage ratio, and the 
global liquidity standard. Some calibration and phase-in arrangements were still to be agreed 
upon in September. This could be seen as the decisive step to adopt the main Basel III 
framework proposed. Minor alterations and specific details were still to be communicated. 
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12 September 2010: 
On the 12 of September of 2010, the BCBS released an announcement that reads that 
the Group governors and Heads of Supervision announced a revision and a substantial 
strengthening of the minimum capital standards. The BCBS announced that it fully endorsed 
the agreement reached on 26 of July 2010. The announcement was specific with respect to 
the increase of capital requirements and the phase-in projections. The matrix with the new 
framework and implementation projections is included in appendix 1. In summary, the new 
agreed reforms would increase the minimum common equity requirements from 2% to 4.5% 
in 2015 and beyond. The capital conservation buffer, a mandatory requirement to withstand 
periods of economic stress, will be introduced in 2016 at 0.625% and it will be raised gradu-
ally up to 2.5% in 2019. The minimum tier-1 capital will be raised up from the current in 
2010 of 4% to 6% in 2019 (BCBS, 2010). This announcement is also a confirmation of the 
introduction of liquidity standards in the Basel III accord and the exact timeline of implemen-
tation was provided. 
16 December 2010 
On 16 December 2010 the BCBS issued two documents: “Basel III: A global regula-
tory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems” and “Basel III: International 
framework for liquidity measurement, standards and monitoring.” These two documents are 
the rules text of the Basel III framework to be fully implemented by 1 January 2019. This 
publication was the actual document that holistically introduced the Basel III regulation 
framework where all the details became known.  
 
4.3.3 - Event study methodology 
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the return behavior of firms around an event 
date (in this case, announcements regarding Basel III) and investigate if indeed the an-
nouncement caused a price swing larger than expected. To do that, an expected return of a 
particular stock at a specific date is calculated. There are several methods for computing the 
expected return of a security. The most widely used method in event studies is the market 
model which will be discussed in this section. By using the market model to estimate the re-
turn of a security, the returns of that security will need be regressed with the returns of a mar-
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ket portfolio over the estimation window. Taking into consideration that this study is using 
only European banks, the market portfolio used was the index Eurostoxx 600. (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 1997) suggest regressing the stock returns with the market portfolio between 50 
and 250 days trailing the event window. In this study, 250 trading days trailing the event 
window were used, so the estimation window is 250 days. The event window will vary de-
pending on the window used, this study uses [0], [-1,+1] and [-3,+3] windows. The post event 
window will not be used in this study. The regression will provide the intercept (alpha) and 
the slope of the function (beta) of the stock in relation to the market portfolio. Beta can also 
be interpreted as the riskiness of the stock compared with the market portfolio. The figure 
below shows the event window timeline. 
 
Figure 4.3.3.1 – Event study timeline 
 
 
 
 
To determine the normal returns for a specific security the market model is used. The 
following formulas were retrieved from (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
“The rate of return on the share price of firm i on day t is expressed as:”  
Equation 4.3.3.1 – Market model return, where VWX is expected rate of return of a particular security i on day t. YW is 
the intercept term of the regression between the stock i and the returns of the market portfolio. Z is the beta coeffi-
cient obtained from running the OLS regression between the returns of security i and the market portfolio. Z is also 
known as the systematic risk of the stock. [WX is the error term with \L[WXM D ] 
AK^ D _K ` aAb^ ` cK^ 
 
After estimating the normal return of stock i, the normal return is deducted from the 
actual return in order to determine the abnormal returns for each bank in the sample. The 
formula is as follows: 
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Equation 4.3.3.2 – Computing the abnormal returns 
(AK^ D AK^ N L_K ` >KAb^M or cK^ D AK^ N L_K ` >KAb^M 
 
Since this study is interested in capturing the aggregated reaction to the Basel regula-
tion, the cross-sectional abnormal returns from the vent window are averaged to obtain the 
abnormal average returns (AAR).  
Equation 4.3.3.3 – Average Abnormal Returns 
((A^ D E (AK^
dP
^HdI
 
To determine the significance of the results a crude dependent adjustment test was 
used as in (Brown & Warner, 1980). To determine whether the AAR across firms in a partic-
ular day are statistically different from zero que following parametric significance test in 
equation 4.3.3.6 is used. The variance for the average abnormal returns is computed by taking 
the variance of the average of the abnormal returns along the estimation window. It’s im-
portant to note that since this is a parametric test, we need to assume that the distributions of 
abnormal returns are normally distributed.  
Equation 4.3.3.4 – Average abnormal returns in the estimation window 
((A^ D E (AK^
dI
^Hde
 
 
Equation 4.3.3.5 – Variance of the average abnormal returns in the estimation window 
RffgP D !h N i Ej((A^ N ((Ak
PdI
^Hde
 
Where ((A is: 
Equation 4.3.3.6 – Average of the average abnormal returns in the estimation window 
((A D l ((A^dI^Hdeh  
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Equation 4.3.3.6 - To test whether AAR is significantly different from zero: 
%em ((A D " 
+ffgn D ((A^Rffg  
To estimate the abnormal returns around an event window larger than [0], the cumula-
tive abnormal returns (CAR) are computed. This allows for a larger window to test the effects 
of the announcement before and after the event date. In this study, the CARs were calculated 
for each event window for every firm. The CAR formula is included below from 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
Equation 4.3.3.7 – Computing the CARs for all i firms 
o(AKL+!p +iM D E (AK^
^P
^H^I
 
Equation 4.3.3.8 - Similar to the AAR, the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) are computed. 
o((A D !qEo(AK
r
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To determine whether the CAAR are significantly different from zero the following t-test is 
done. Just like the test for the significance of AAR, this test also assumes that each bank’s 
abnormal returns are normally distributed.  
 
Equation 4.3.3.9 – Significance test for the CAAR 
%em o((A D " 
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4.3.4 - Event study results 
 
From here onwards, the business models will be labelled as follows: 
Model Label Type of Structure 
Model 1 (T/T) Traditional assets / Traditional liabilities 
Model 2 (NT/T) Non-Traditional assets / Traditional liabilities 
Model 3 (T/NT) Traditional assets / Non-Traditional liabilities 
Model 4 (NT/NT) Non-traditional assets / Non-traditional liabilities 
 
4.3.4.1 – Event 1: 30 of March of 2009 
On the 30th of March of 2009 the average abnormal returns (AAR) for all banks in the 
sample was negative, being -1.11%. Model 2 (NT/T) ,3 (T/NT) and 4 (NT/NT) banks had 
larger negative AAR than model 1 (T/T) banks which had a negative AAR of -0.51%. This 
result is in line with the expectation that more traditional banks would be affected the least by 
Basel III as predicted in the report by (McKinsey&Company, 2010). The announcement from 
the 30th of March 2009 reported that a big focus of Basel III will be devoted to derivative and 
securitization businesses, and on the liquidity sources of banks so the results make sense from 
this perspective. However, most of the results obtained were not statistically significant. Only 
the result for window [0] on Model 3 (T/NT) is statistically significant with a 0.10 signifi-
cance level, therefore it is not possible to make any statistical inferences for the remaining 
models. On the event date, the AAR for Model 3 was negative by -1.62%. The market did not 
have sufficient information yet to quantify the specific impacts Basel III would bring. This 
could be an explanation why the impacts were not more significant.  
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) on the larger event windows [-3,+3] and [-
1,+1] were not statistically significant, so no inferences can be made. 
The histograms on window [0] and [-1,+1] show that the abnormal returns have a ten-
dency towards zero. The histogram on window [-3,+3] shows positive skewness as there are 
some outliers on the right side of the histogram.  
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Table 4.3.4.1.1 : Represents AAR and CAAR on the 30 of March of 2009. In parenthesis is the t test. The asterisk 
represents the level of confidence. * denotes significance level of 0.10, ** significance level of 0.05 and *** significance 
level of 0.01. 
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Graph 4.3.4.1.1 – Histogram AR and CARs 30 Mar 2009 
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4.3.4.2 – Event 2: 17 of December 2009 
On the 17th of December of 2009, the AAR of the sample of banks was very close to 
zero, -0.08%. The results on the event date are not significantly different from zero as an ag-
gregate or for any business model. The AAR results suggest that the announcement did not 
cause a reaction in the market. This could be because the measures were already expected, or 
the announcement did not present anything new.  
On the larger event window [-3,+3], the CAAR for the aggregate of banks was -3.25%, 
statistically significant with a 0.10 significance level. Model 1 (T/T) CAAR result was -
3.95% also statistically significant with a 0.10 significance level. The remaining models also 
had negative AARs but the results were not statistically significant, so no inferences can be 
made. The statistically significant results in the [-3,+3] event window for the aggregate and 
for Model 1 (T/T) banks were negative, which suggests that the market expects lower future 
returns for the aggregate of banks in the sample and in particular for Model 1 (T/T) banks. 
This event was marked by the first two comprehensive documents that were to become the 
Basel III framework. Just like in the previous announcement, it was expected for the AR of 
banks to drop, which this event study confirms. It was also expected for the less traditional 
models to have a bigger decrease in abnormal returns after this announcement but none of the 
results for non-traditional models were statistically significant, so no conclusion can be made 
in this regard. All histograms show a tendency to zero. 
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Table 4.3.4.2.1 Represents AAR and CAAR on the 17th of December of 2009. In parenthesis is the t test. The asterisk 
represents the level of confidence. * denotes significance level of 0.1, ** significance level of 0.05 and *** significance 
level of 0.01. 
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4.3.4.3 – Event 3: 16 of July 2010 
On the 16th of July of 2010, the AAR of the sample was of 0.86%, statistically signifi-
cant with a significance level of 0.10. Model 1 (T/T) banks had AAR on event date of 1.07% 
with a significance level of 0.05. The market reaction was positive, which was an unexpected 
result prior to the study taking into consideration that the countercyclical capital buffer was 
introduced. Possibly the market assessed that this new additional capital buffer could be posi-
tive for banking activity and considered the announcement a sign that the new Basel frame-
work was going in the right direction. Model 2 (NT/T), 3 (T/NT) and 4 (NT/NT) did not have 
statistically significant AAR on the event date, so no inferences can be made regarding these 
models. 
 The CAAR results show the same trend. The CAAR on event window [-1,+1] for the 
aggregate of all banks was 2.23% with a significance level of 0.10. Model 1 (T/T) CAAR [-
1,+1] was 2.39% with a significance level of 0.05. Model 2 (NT/T) CAAR on window [-
1,+1] was 2.03% with a significance level of 0.10. Model 3 (T/NT) CAAR on window [-
1,+1] was 1.73% with a 0.10 significance level.  
Model 1 (T/T) and Model 2 (NT/T) had slightly larger abnormal returns than Model 3 
(T/NT). Model 1 (T/T) and 2 (NT/T) have a traditional liability structure, so the market could 
be rewarding this characteristic.  
All three histograms show a slight skewness to the right. 
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Table 4.3.4.3.1: Represents AAR and CAAR on the 16th of July of 2010. In parenthesis is the t test. The asterisk rep-
resents the level of confidence. * denotes significance level of 0.10, ** significance level of 0.05 and *** significance of 
0.01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!  
# # # (+&89:;&$"("&# # #
!!"# $%&'(# )%*+(#,#-$.$/# )%*+(#0#-1$.$/# )%*+(#2#-$.1$/# )%*+(#3#-1$.1$/#
4'5#6%78&# ,92# ,=2# 0:# 2?# 2#
<2# <=>2@299#-<=>9;393/#
<=>2?0,=#
-<=>929@?/#
<=>@,=;;#
-<=>??9,;/#
=>=3=0;0#
-=>=9,:==/#
<0>22?:9#
-<,>39,20/#
<0# <=>=@@:;#-<=>,2:9,/#
<=>=;9:@#
-<=>,=::;/#
<=>=999;#
-<=>,0@?:/#
<=>,,:39#
-<=>0,,22/#
=>2?9==?#
-=>03?@3,/#
<,# =>?@::@0#-0>=,=,99/AA#
,>=:9,0=#
-0>=3;0;@/AA#
,>0@990;#
-0>=9=303/AA#
=>;=;,0@#
-=>?=,=,?/#
=>,39:;?#
-=>=?0?93/#
"& ")0+/%(.&,()*%/."0-1&
()"*/$0"&
,$)"$((""-11&
")$/*.!%&
,")/"/$*+-&
")+0*+0!&
,()$$++..-&
()*/$0*.&
,()"%.%$0-&
,# =>2??9,0#-=>:0?2,@/#
=>02=03:#
-=>322,9:/#
=>;,@0=3#
-=>:32=;;/#
=>;2?22@#
-=>?@0=3,/#
2>2,;@03#
-0>=:3::=/#
0# <=>;232;#-<,>,=:@9/#
<=>32,:;#
-<=>:,039/#
<=>:,9@=#
-<,>22;2=/#
<=>;02@0#
-<=>?23=0/#
<,>;3?0?#
-<=>?930=/#
2# <=>0;0=2#-<=>;00?0/#
<=>22920#
-<=>@23@0/#
=>=3;@?0#
-=>=93@02/#
<=>;?:,,#
-<,>=@@::/#
3>2?@,92#
0>9@322;/#
6!!"# $%&'(# )%*+(#,#-$.$/# )%*+(#0#-1$.$/# )%*+(#2#-$.1$/# )%*+(#3#-1$.1$/#
B<2>C2D# ,>=,@3@;#-=>9?9,=;/#
,>,90;=,#
-=>:22939/#
=>;9,033#
-=>2;0@0=/#
=>;20,9?#
-=>2;:9?0/#
@>,,=299#
-,>3;000:/#
B<,>C,D# 0>0223?=#-0>@9;330/AAA#
0>2?,@3?#
-0>;?9:=9/AA#
0>=2,3@?#
-,>?,;;=9/A#
,>920,39#
-,>9:2:3:/A#
;>0=@2;:#
-,>:?=,,?/#
^G!%.!X5+!#Q%Q! 6^Ga&%=b%c!%.!X5+!#Q%Q! 6^G!a&C=bCc!%.!X5+!#Q%Q!
J%!
!
4.3.4.4 – Event 4: 26 of July 2010 
On the 26th of July of 2010 the average abnormal returns were not significantly differ-
ent from zero on the date of the event, but they were very significant on the day following the 
event. The BCBS does not mention at what time they posted the press release, but the results 
suggest that the press release happened past market hours. On the day of the event only Mod-
el 2 (NT/T) had a statistically significant AAR of 1.14% with significance level of 0.10. On 
the day following the event, the AAR for the sample of banks was positive at 1.73% with a 
significance level of 0.01. Model 1 (T/T), Model 2 (NT/T) and Model 3 (T/NT) had statisti-
cally significant AAR of 1.40%, 2.35% and 2.31% respectively and with significance levels 
of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.01 respectively. Model 2 (NT/T) and 3 (T/NT) had higher abnormal re-
turns than Model 1 (T/T). A big focus of this announcement was on the agreement and defini-
tion of the liquidity reform package. The market could be rewarding better liquidity require-
ments, which goes in line with the suggestion by (Bordeleau & Graham, 2010) that less tradi-
tional banks benefit more by holding more liquid assets. The market could be rewarding the 
higher liquidity that these banks will have to hold. This conclusion goes against (Mergaerts & 
Vennet, 2016) and (Molyneux & Thornton, 1992), which obtained the opposite result. 
The CAAR on window [-1,+1] of 1.95% for the entire sample of banks is statistically 
significant with a significance level of 0.05. Model 2 (NT/T) and Model 3 (T/NT) also had 
statistically significant CAARs of 3.14% and 2.10% respectively with significance levels of 
0.01 and 0.05 respectively. 
The histograms show that there is a tendency for the abnormal returns to be above ze-
ro as they are skewed to the right.  
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Table 4.3.4.4.1: Represents AAR and CAAR on the 26th of July of 2010. In parenthesis is the t test. The asterisks is 
the level of confidence. * denotes significance level of 0.10, ** significance level of 0.05 and *** significance level of 
0.01. 
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4.3.4.5 – Event 5: 12 of September 2010 
On the 12th of September of 2010, the AAR for the entire sample of banks was 0.51%. 
However, this result is not statistically significant. The AARs and the CAARs on and around 
this date were not significantly different from zero, which tells us that the press release of the 
12th of September either did not provide new information to the market or the new measures 
will not significantly impact the banks in the sample. The exception was on Model 3 (T/NT) 
which had a positive statistically significant AAR on the event date of 1.24% with signifi-
cance level of 0.05.  
On the 12th of September 2010 the BCBS increased the capital requirements and in-
troduced a new capital buffer, the capital conservation buffer. One possible explanation for 
the Model 3 (T/NT) result is that the market could be rewarding the more stringent capital 
requirements because it believes that it will not hurt the long-term returns of Model 3 (T/NT) 
banks but will actually improve it. The announcement also provided phase-in projections. 
The market could also be rewarding the fact that the implementation will be phased-in and 
will not take full effect immediately which would require banks to accelerate their compli-
ance efforts which would be costlier. 
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Table x: Represents AAR and CAAR on the 12th of September of 2010. In parenthesis is the t test. The asterisks is the level 
of confidence. * denotes significance level of 0.10, ** significance level of 0.05 and *** significance level of 0.01. 
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4.3.4.6 – Event 6: 16 of December 2010 
On the 16th of December of 2010 the full draft of the Basel III document was pub-
lished. The AAR for the entire sample of banks was close to zero and not statistically differ-
ent from zero. Individually, Model 1 (T/T), 2 (NT/T) and 3 (T/NT) have values close to zero 
and the results are not significantly different from zero. These results show that market par-
ticipants either already knew what the conditions of Basel III were going to be, so the release 
of the final document was not material.  
The CAAR on the larger window [-3,+3] for the aggregate of banks has a statistical 
significant result of -1.96% with a significance level of 0.10. Model 2 (NT/T) CAAR on win-
dow [-3,+3] was -3.39% and this result is also statistically significant with a significance lev-
el of 0.05. On the larger event window, the market predicted lower future returns for the ag-
gregate of banks in the sample and specifically for Model 2 (NT/T) banks. Taking these re-
sults in consideration, the market could be assessing that the full Basel III reform as intro-
duced in 16th of December 2010 will negatively impact the banks in the sample and in partic-
ular Model 2 (NT/T) banks.   
The histograms show a tendency towards zero with a few outliers on the left side of 
the histogram on window [-3,+3] and [-1,+1].  
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Table 4.3.4.6.1: Represents AAR and CAAR on the 16th of December of 2010. In parenthesis is the t test. The asterisks is the 
level of confidence. * denotes significance level of 0.10, ** significance level of 0.05 and *** significance level of 0.01. 
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4.4 - Regression analysis methodology and results 
!
In this thesis, an OLS regression analysis is used to understand if the effects captured 
by the ARs and the CARs could be explained by the business model categorization method 
used. Various independent variables are also added to the analysis to determine if the AR and 
the CARs could also be explained by other factors and make the regression model more ro-
bust. The additional variables used are market capitalization, return on assets, return on equi-
ty and equity over total assets. 
4.4.1 – OLS Regression independent variables 
!
Market capitalization 
The market capitalization is used as an independent variable to determine if size plays 
a role in the abnormal returns results obtained. It could be argued that larger banks can bene-
fit from economies of scale when working towards Basel III compliance and therefore have a 
size advantage. The opposite can also be argued, as larger banks could be at a disadvantage 
because they can be classified as systemically important banks and required to hold larger 
capital buffers. 
Returns on assets and equity 
These independent variables are related to profitability. It is reasonable to assume that 
more profitable banks can more easily build up the capital needed to fulfill the Basel III re-
quirements and as a consequence the abnormal returns be less impacted by the announce-
ments in comparison with banks with lower profitability. 
 Equity over total assets 
This is a bank capital metric. Banks that have more equity and less liabilities are less 
leveraged and therefore Basel III can have a smaller impact on these banks as the liquidity 
and capital requirements won’t be as cumbersome. 
!  
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4.4.2 - Univariate analysis 
In this thesis, a univariate regression analysis is conducted with all the above inde-
pendent variables to understand which variables best explain the AR and CAR results ob-
tained. The results show the R-Squared results were quite low for all variables, so the explan-
atory power of these regressions is low. It can be concluded from these results that these vari-
ables cannot be taken in isolation when explaining ARs and CARs. 
Univariate regression analysis table 
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Market Cap 
Regarding market capitalization, there are statistically significant results for every 
event. For announcements 1, 2, 3, and 6, the models predict an inverse relationship between 
market capitalization and abnormal returns, as the market capitalization increases the ARs 
and CARs decrease. For event dates 4 and 5 the inverse is true, as market capitalization in-
creases, the ARs and CARs increase. This suggests that the impact of market capitalization is 
not straightforward as larger banks can have an advantage in some events and be at a disad-
vantage in other events. One possible explanation could be that larger banks can benefit from 
economies of scale when applying compliance to Basel III but could be at a disadvantage if 
they are too big because they would be considered systemically important and therefore be 
subject to stricter capital requirements. The R-Squared values were low, the highest value 
was on Event 1, window [0] with a R-Squared value of 0.0841. It can be concluded form 
these results that the regressions have low explanatory power.  
For the first announcement, the coefficient on the event date [0] predicts a decrease of 
abnormal returns of -0.058% per one billion increase in market capitalization. This result was 
statistically significant with a p-value lower than 0.01. At time window [-1,+1], the coeffi-
cient obtained was -0.0445% and the p-value is below 0.05. On event 2, the only statistically 
significant coefficient was on the [-3,+3] window with a coefficient of -0.044 with a p-value 
below 0.10. On event 3, the only event window with a statistically significant coefficient was 
AR[0] with -0.0169 with a p-value below 0.05. Event 4 on window [-3,+3] had a coefficient 
of 0.0467 with a p-value below 0.10 and event window [-1,+1] with a coefficient of 0.0453 
and p-value below 0.05. Event 5 shows two statistically significant coefficients on window 
[0] and [-1,+1]. On window [0] the coefficient was 0.0169 with a p-value below 0.10 and 
window [-1,+1] coefficient was 0.0270 also with a p-value below 0.10. All coefficients in 
event 6 are statistically significant. On window [0] the coefficient of -0.0171 has a p-value 
below 0.05, event window [-1,+1] coefficient of -0.0219 has a p-value below 0.10 and win-
dow  [-3,+3] coefficient of -0.0472 has a p-value below 0.05.   
The statistically significant coefficients are small. This tells us that even if the results 
are statistically significant, market capitalization does not have a big influence on ARs and 
CARs as an increase in market capitalization will have a residual impact in abnormal returns. 
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ROA 
For return on assets, the results turned out not statistically significant for most coeffi-
cients except in 5 cases. Some regression coefficients were different from the expected results. 
It would be expected for all statistically significant coefficients to be positive. The logic 
would be that banks should expect higher abnormal returns the more profitable they are. 
However, this did not turn up to be the case. Event 2 and 5 had statistically significant posi-
tive coefficients while event 3, 4 and 6 had statistically significant negative coefficients. One 
possible explanation could be that the more profitable banks have assets and liabilities in their 
balance sheet subjected to large capital requirements increases justifying the market reaction 
to the announcements. 
Event 2 on window [-3,+3] has a coefficient of 0.709 with a p-value below 0.10. This 
can be interpreted as a 1% increase in ROA translates into an increase of 0.71% of abnormal 
returns. Event 5 has a statistically significant coefficient on window [-1,+1] of 0.268 with a 
p-value below 0.10. Event 3 on window [0] has a negative coefficient of -0.212 with a p-
value below 0.05. Event 4 on window [-1,+1] has a statistically significant coefficient of -
0.445 with a p-value below 0.01. Event 6 on window [0] has a statistically significant coeffi-
cient of -0.188 with a p-value below 0.10.  
The R-Squared values were low, the highest value being 0.034. From this, it can be 
concluded that the regression does not have high explanatory power.  
ROE 
Regarding ROE, similarly to ROA, the coefficient of the regression did not return the 
values expected prior to the study. It was expected that all statistically significant coefficients 
would turn out to be positive as more profitable banks can more easily build up capital ratios. 
However, this prediction did not materialize in the results. The regressions returned very low 
coefficients, so even if the results would be statistically significant, 1% increase in ROE 
would not have a big effect on ARs and CARs. The statistically significant coefficients in 
events 2 and 5 are positive while the statistically significant coefficient in events 3 and 4 were 
negative. Event 6 has one negative statistically significant coefficient on window [0] and a 
positive statistically significant coefficient on window [-3,+3]. Similar to ROA, it could be 
argued that the more profitable banks could be the most affected negatively by Basel III re-
quirements justifying the negative market reaction to the announcements. 
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Event 2 on window [-3,+3] has a statistically significant coefficient of 0.0731 with a 
p-value below 0.05. The interpretation of this result is that an increase of 1% in ROE trans-
lates into an increase of 0.0731% in abnormal returns. Event 3 has two statistically significant 
coefficients of -0.0416 and -0.0771 on window [0] and [-1,+1] respectively both a with p-
value below 0.01. Event 4 has one statistically significant coefficient on window [-1,+1] of -
0.041 with a p-value below 0.05. Event 5 has two statistically significant coefficients on win-
dow [-3,+3] and [-1,+1] of 0.0548 and 0.0304  respectively with a with p-value below 0.01 
and 0.05 respectively. Event 6 also has two statistically significant coefficients on window 
[0] and [-3,+3] of -0.0292  and 0.0576 respectively both with a p-value below 0.01. 
The R-Squared results also turned out to have low explanatory power for all event 
windows. 
Equity/Assets 
 On the equity/assets regressions there were statistically significant results on events 2, 
4 and 5. The majority of the statistically significant results were negative except on event 2 
which was positive.  
On event 2, the coefficient on window [-3,+3] is 0.167 with a p-value below 0.01. 
This result tells us that a 1% increase in equity over assets ratio, it is expected for the cumula-
tive abnormal returns to increase by 0.167%. This value is the only positive coefficient ob-
tained in all event windows. On event 4, all three coefficients obtained for all three event 
windows were highly statistically significant. On window [0], [-3,+3] and [-1,+1] the coeffi-
cients obtained were -0.051, -0.127, and -0.136 respectively. These coefficients are negative 
which tells us that an increase of 1% in equity over assets ratio would result in a decrease of 
cumulative abnormal returns by -0.051% for window [0], -0.1268% for window [-3,+3], and 
-0.1363% for window [-1,+1]. On event 5, only window [0] had a statistically significant re-
sult with a coefficient of -0.837 with a p-value below 0.01.  
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4.4.3 – Multiple regression analysis 
This section includes two multiple OLS regression analysis. First, ARs and CARs 
were regressed on business models as dummy variables. Second, to get a more robust model, 
an OLS regression was computed with all independent variables previously discussed and 
also including business models as dummy variables.  
4.4.3.1 – Regression with business models and results 
In this section the regression of ARs and CARs with business models as dummy vari-
ables is computed. The regression equation is stated as follows: 
Equation 4.4.3.1 – OLS regression of ARs and CARs with business models as dummy variables 
(AK^uo(AK^ D _ ` aIh*;0-.i `.aPh*;0-.: `.avh*;0-.w 
The intercept captures the expected ARs and CARs for Model 1 (T/T) banks. The R-
Squared results obtained were low. The highest R-Squared results was 0.0509 on event 1 on 
window [0]. It can be inferred that the regression model has low explanatory power.   
Event 1 – 30 March 2009 
Analyzing table 4.4.3.1, there are two statistically significant coefficients in event 1 
on window [0]: Model 2 (NT/T) and Model 3 (T/NT). Model 2 (NT/T) has a negative coeffi-
cient of -1.29 with a p-value below 0.10. Model 3 (T/NT) coefficient is -1.46 with a p-value 
below 0.05. It can be inferred from the data that Model 2 (NT/T) banks are expected to have 
AR -1.29% lower than Model 1 (T/T) banks. Similarly, Model 3 (T/NT) banks are expected 
to have AR -1.46% lower than Model 1 (T/T) banks. This result is in line with the results 
obtained in the event study section which suggest a decrease in the value of Model 3 (T/NT) 
banks. The results on window [0] go in line with the expectations prior to the study, which 
were that less-traditional models would have lower ARs as a result of this announcement.  
On window [-3,+3], the intercept term is 2.95 and statistically significant with a p-
value below 0.01. Model 4 (NT/NT) coefficient is 9.28 and statistically significant with a p-
value below 0.05. This can be interpreted as Model 4 (NT/NT) banks being expected to have 
cumulative abnormal returns 9.28% above Model 1 (T/T) banks. The intercept term captures 
Model 1 (T/T) banks, so they are expected to have an AR of 2.95%. 
The intercept term on the larger window [-3,+3] is statistically significant and positive. 
Model 4 (NT/NT) coefficients is also positive and large. No more coefficients were statisti-
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cally significant in the window [-3,+3]. Window [-1,+1] did not have any statistically signifi-
cant coefficients. 
Event 2 – 17th of December 2009 
On event 2, only window [-1,+1] and [-3,+3] have statistically significant coefficients. 
On event window [-3,+3] the intercept term is -3.63 and has a p-value below 0.01. This can 
be interpreted as Model 1 (T/T) banks are expected to have a CAR of -3.63%. 
On window [-1,+1], the intercept term is -1.072 with a p-value below 0.01 and Model 
2 (NT/T) has a coefficient of 1.427 with a p-value below 0.05. The remaining coefficients are 
not statistically different from 0. Interpreting the results, Model 1 (T/T) banks are expected to 
have -1.072% CAR and Model 2 (NT/T) banks are expected to have 1.427% higher CAR 
than Model 1 (T/T) banks.  
The results suggest that the market is penalizing Model 1 (T/T) Banks more than 
Model 2 (NT/T) banks. The announcement of 17th of December 2009 was very comprehen-
sive as it released the first two major documents of what was to become Basel III. The docu-
ments described the LCR and NSFR and increased capital requirements for exposures arising 
from derivatives and repo transactions. However, window [-1,+1] results suggest that the less 
traditional Model 2 (NT/T) are expected to have higher CARs than Model 1 (T/T) banks. 
These results could indicate that the market expected the Basel III framework to hurt tradi-
tional banks more than non-traditional banks or that regulation on non-traditional areas of 
banking was not as strict as expected prior to the announcement. Another possibility is that 
the market assumes that non-traditional banks can circumvent this regulation by engaging in 
regulatory arbitrage as suggested by (Balthazar, 2006) (Ayadi, et al., 2012). 
Event 3 – 16 of July 2010 
On event 3, the intercept term is statistically significant and positive for all event win-
dows. The intercept terms are 1.089, 1.243, and 2.467 for windows [0], [-3,+3] and [-1,+1] 
respectively. The regression model predicts the CARs for Model 1 (T/T) banks in the sample 
to be positive and relatively large (above 1%). On window [-3,+3], Model 4 (NT/NT) has a 
statistically significant coefficient of 4.867. This can be interpreted as Model 4 (NT/NT) 
banks are expected to have CAR 4.867% above Model 1 (T/T) banks. The remaining coeffi-
cients were not significant on this event.  
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On this announcement, the BCBS announced the countercyclical capital buffer. The 
market could be perceiving this new ratio as positive for the long-term profitability of the 
banking sector. This could explain the positive and statistically significant AR results in 
Model 1 (T/T) banks. 
Event 4 – 26th of July 2010 
On Event 4, all the intercept terms are highly statistically significant, all having a p-
value below 0.01. The intercept terms were 0.670, 1.50, and 1.312 for windows [0], [-3,+3] 
and [-1,+1] respectively. This can be interpreted as the regression model predicts the CARs 
for Model 1 (T/T) banks in the sample to be positive. Model 2 (NT/T) banks also have a sta-
tistically significant coefficient at the [-1,+1] event window of 2.330 with a p-value below 
0.05. This tells us that Model 2 (NT/T) banks are expected to have 2.33% higher CAR than 
Model 1 (T/T) banks. 
On event 4, as previously noted in the event study section, a big focus of this an-
nouncement was on the definition and agreement of the liquidity reform package, so the mar-
ket could be rewarding better liquidity requirements. On window [-1,+1] Model 2 (NT/T) 
banks seem to be the most reward banks by the market after this announcement. On this an-
nouncement, a liquidity reform package was agreed, so the market could be perceiving that 
Model 2 (NT/T) banks would benefit the most by the introduction of liquidity requirements 
as defined in announcement 4. 
Event 5 – 12th of September 2010 
Event 5 only had 2 statistically significant coefficients. Model 3 (T/NT) on window 
[0] has a coefficient of 1.076 with a p-value below 0.01 and Model 3 (T/NT) on window [-
1,+1] has a coefficient of 1.201 with a p-value below 0.05. So Model 3 (T/NT) banks are ex-
pected to have higher CAR than Model 1 (T/T) banks on event windows [0] and [-1,+1].  
 The conclusion of this result is similar to the one on the event study section. As noted 
in the event study section: “On the 12th of September 2010 the BCBS increased the capital 
requirements and introduced a new capital buffer, the capital conservation buffer. One pos-
sible explanation for the Model 3 (T/NT) results is that the market could be rewarding the 
more stringent capital requirements because it believes that it will not hurt the long-term 
profitability of Model 3 (T/NT) banks but will actually improve it. The announcement also 
provided phase-in projections. The market could also be rewarding the fact that the imple-
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mentation will be phased-in and will not take full effect immediately which would require 
banks to accelerate their compliance efforts.” 
Event 6 – 16th of December 2010 
 On Event 6, the intercept term of -0.539 on event window [-1,+1] is statistically sig-
nificant with a p-value below 0.05. This is the only statistically significant result in this event 
in all event windows. On this date, the final documents for the Basel III were announced. The 
lack of more statistically significant results could mean that the market already knew what to 
expect from Basel III so the majority of the information was not material. The only inference 
that can be made from the results is that on event window [-1,+1] Model 1 (T/T) banks are 
expected to have negative abnormal returns of -0.539%.  
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Table 4.4.3.1 – OLS multiple regression with business models as dummy variables and ARs and CARs as dependent 
variables. 
OLS multiple regression analysis of AR and CAR with business models as independent variables 
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4.4.3.2 – Multiple regression with business models and the control inde-
pendent variables and results 
!
A multiple regression with all the variables previously discussed is now conducted to 
provide a more robust regression model with more explanatory independent variables in an 
effort to obtain a more complete regression model.  
The equation for the OLS multiple regression is the following: 
Equation 4.4.3.2 – OLS Multiple regression of ARs and CARs with all independent variables including 
business models as independent variables. 
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This regression has a higher explanatory R-Squared values than the previous regres-
sions, however it can still be considered to have relatively low explanatory power. R-Squared 
results for these regressions range from 0.009 to 0.21. 
Event 1 – 30 of March 2009  
On event 1, the event window [0] had the highest number of statistically significant 
coefficients. On window [0], Model 3 (T/NT) has a statistically significant coefficient of -
1.35 and Model 4 (NT/NT) has a statistically significant coefficient of -3.41. These results 
indicate that Model 3 (T/NT) banks are expected to have lower AR by -1.35% than Model 1 
(T/T) banks and Model 4 (NT/NT) banks are expected to have lower AR by -3.41% than 
Model 1 (T/T) banks. These results suggest that the less traditional Model 3 (T/NT) and 
Model 4 (NT/NT) are expected to have lower ARs than Model 1 (T/T) banks which was an 
expected result because the announcement place emphasis on regulating the less traditional 
forms of banking that were lightly regulated prior to Basel III. On the larger window [-3,+3], 
the intercept term of 2.48 is statistically significant with a p-value below 0.10 and Model 4 
(NT/NT) coefficient is 10.70 with a p-value below 0.10 so Model 4 (NT/NT) banks are ex-
pected to have higher AR than Model 1 (T/T) banks by 10.70%.  
The market cap coefficient of -0.059 on window [0] is statistically significant with a 
p-value below 0.01. This tells us that the AR is expected to decrease by -0.059% per one bil-
lion increase in market cap. These results show that a large swing in market cap does not 
translate in a large change in AR, so according to the model, size does not play a big part in 
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the variation of abnormal returns in this announcement. Also, the fact that the coefficient is 
negative tells us that the larger the bank, the lower expected AR, this could be explained by 
the additional capital systemically important banks could be expected to hold. The market cap 
coefficient on window [-3,+3] is also significant at -0.0401 with a p-value below 0.10. Return 
on equity also has a statistically significant coefficient of 0.0643 with a p-value below 0.10. 
This result can be interpreted as a 1% increase in return on equity translates into an increase 
of AR by 0.0643% which is an intuitive result as more profitable banks could be expected to 
have higher AR after the announcement than less profitable banks.  
Event 2 – 17 of December 2010 
On event 2, the intercept terms are -5.72 and -1.15 for windows [-3,+3] and [-1,+1] 
respectively and statistically significant with a p-value below 0.01 and 0.05 respectively. 
Model 2 (NT/T) also have statistically significant coefficients. The coefficient for window [-
3,+3] is 1.97 and for window [-1,+1] is 1.48. From this we can conclude that be Model 2 
(NT/T) banks are expected to have higher AR than Model 1 (T/T) banks on Event 2. On this 
date, the BCBS released the first major consultative document that would become Basel III, 
according to the results, the market considered the new framework to be more detrimental to 
Model 1 (T/T) banks than to Model 2 (NT/T) Banks. A possible explanation could be that the 
market was expecting stricter regulation for non-traditional banks than the one communicated 
on this announcement. 
On event window [-3,+3], the ROE coefficient of 0.14 is positive and statistically sig-
nificant with a p-value below 0.05. This means that a 1% increase in ROE translates into an 
increase of 0.14% in abnormal returns. Also on window [-3,+3], the equity/assets coefficient 
of 20.28 is positive and statistically significant with a p-value below 0.01. This can be inter-
preted as a 1% increase in equity over assets represents a 0.20% increase in CAR. 
Event 3 – 16 of July 2010 
On event 3, the intercept terms that represent Model 1 (T/T) banks are statistically 
significant in all event windows. The intercept terms are 1.73, 2.29, and 3.93 for windows [0], 
[-3,+3] and [-1,+1] respectively. On this date the countercyclical capital buffer was intro-
duced, and according to the results, the market believes this capital requirement will benefit 
traditional banks or Model 1 (T/T) banks.  
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ROA coefficients are positive and statistically significant on window [0] and [-3,+3] 
at 0.30 and 1.18. According to these coefficients, as ROA increases, so increases ARs. This 
result is particularly high on window [-3,+3]. Surprisingly ROE coefficients are negative and 
also statistically significant, so as ROE increases, AR decreases. The equity/assets has a coef-
ficient of -4.88 on window [0] and is significant with p-value below 0.05. It can be concluded 
that a 1% increase in equity over assets translates into a reduction of AR by -0.049%. 
 
Event 4 – 26 July 2010 
On event 4, the intercept terms that represent Model 1 (T/T) banks are statistically 
significant in all event windows. The intercept terms are 1.13, 2.83, and 2.52 for windows [0], 
[-3,+3] and [-1,+1] respectively. According to the results, the market benefited Model 1 (T/T) 
banks after this announcement as the expected ARs are positive. Model 2 (NT/T) has a coef-
ficient of 1.89 with a p-value significant at the 0.10 level. This means that Model 2 (NT/T) 
banks are expected to have larger CAR than Model 1 (T/T) banks by 1.89%. As mentioned, 
this announcement focused mostly on the definition agreement of the liquidity reform that 
would make part in Basel III. The market seems to be rewarding these reforms. 
Almost all coefficients on the profitability variables are statistical significant. On 
ROA the coefficient of 0.40 on window [0] is significant with a p-value below 0.10 and the 
coefficient of 1.04 on window [-3,+3] is significant with a p-value also below 0.10. The posi-
tive coefficients can be interpreted as ROE increases, so does AR. Inversely, the coefficients 
for ROE are negative. The ROE coefficients are -0.05, -0.09 and -0.06 on windows [0], [-
3,+3] and [-1,+1] respectively. This implies that an increase in ROE reduces the AR results. 
Equity/assets coefficients are also significant in all event windows being -5.43, -17.37, and -
12.65 for windows [0], [-3,+3] and [-1,+1] respectively. The coefficients are negative which 
implies that an increase in the equity over assets ratio translates into a reduction of AR. 
Event 5 – 12 of September 2010 
On event 5, the intercept term of 1.03 on window [0] is statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. Model 3 (T/NT) coefficients of 0.93 and 1.19 on windows [0] and [-1,+1] respec-
tively and are both significant at the 0.05 level. These results mean that Model 3 (T/NT) 
banks are expected higher AR than Model 1 (T/T) in window [0] and in window [-1,+1]. The 
remaining business model coefficients are not statistically significant. On the 12th of Septem-
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ber 2010 the BCBS announced the introduction of higher capital standards into the frame-
work and also presented a phase-in schedule for the implementation of Basel III. The coeffi-
cients indicate the impact of this announcement was positive on the AR of the banks, Model 
3 (NT/T) benefiting more than Model 1 (T/T) banks. A possibility would be that the market is 
benefiting the phase-in grace period given to banks given them more time to be fully Basel III 
compliant. 
The return on assets coefficient of 0.33 is positive and statistically significant at the 
0.10 level. The coefficient is positive which means that a 1% increase in return on assets cor-
responds an increase of 0.33% of AR. The return on equity is also positive with a coefficient 
of 0.08 which can be understood as a 1% increase in return on equity corresponds to an in-
crease of 0.08% of AR. The equity over assets coefficient of -10.19 is statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level. A 1% increase in return on assets ration corresponds to a decrease of 0.10% 
in AR 
Event 6 – 16 of December 2010 
On Event 6, only the intercept term on window [-3,+3] of -2.82 is statistically signifi-
cant at the 0m01 level. Model 4 (NT/NT) coefficients -1.96 and -6.05 on window [0] and [-
3,+3] respectively and are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. These results reveal that it 
is expected for Model 4 (NT/NT) banks to have lower AR than Model 1 (T/T) banks by -
1.96% in case of window [0] and -6.05 in case of window [-3,+3]. This event was market by 
the introduction of the final Basel III documents, and similarly as in the event study section, 
the impact was negative but did not produce a large number of statistically significant results.  
The market capitalization coefficient of -0.013 is significant at the 0.10 level in win-
dow [0]. The coefficient being negative and according to the model, a 1 billion increase in 
market capitalization translates into a reduction of AR by -0.013%. On window [-3,+3], the 
market capitalization coefficient of -0.043 is also statistically significant at the level of 0.05. 
Despite the market capitalization coefficients being statistically significant for two event 
windows, the impact on AR is relatively low. Return on assets has a statistically significant 
coefficient of -0.88 on event window [-3,+3]. This coefficient is rather significant because a 
1% increase in return on assets decreases AR by -0.88%. Event window [0] has a return on 
equity coefficient of -0.037 statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Event window [-3,+3] 
has a return on equity coefficient of 0.119 statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Event 
window [-3,+3] has an equity over assets coefficient of 16.65 statistically significant at the 
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0.01 level. This means that an increase in the equity over assets ratio translates into an in-
crease of AR by 0.1665% according to the regression model. 
 
Table 4.4.3.2 – Multiple regression of ARs and CARs on all independent variables 
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5 - Conclusion 
Basel III will bring large changes to the world banking landscape. This study tries to 
assess to what extent these changes will benefit certain types of banks in Europe more than 
others. To investigate this question, this study distinguishes between bank business models 
using a k-means clustering model based on the balance sheet structure of each bank. Assets 
and liabilities were analyzed and grouped into traditional vs non-traditional categories. Each 
bank was given two values: percentage of traditional assets (loans to customers) of total earn-
ing assets and percentage of traditional liabilities (deposits) of total funding liabilities. After 
these two ratios were computed and assigned to all banks in the sample, the k-means cluster-
ing algorithm was run to identify and assign business models to all banks. The end result are 
4 different banking business models: Model 1 with a traditional asset structure and a tradi-
tional liability structure, Model 2 with a non-traditional asset structure and a traditional liabil-
ity structure, Model 3 with a traditional asset structure and a non-traditional liability structure, 
and Model 4 with a non-traditional asset structure and a non-traditional liability structure. 
The majority of banks in the sample belong to Model 1 (T/T) category with 103 banks. Mod-
el 2 (NT/T) has 28 banks, Model 3 (T/NT) has 39 banks, and the model with the least number 
of banks was Model 4 (NT/NT) with only 3 banks. 
Following the business model categorization, an event study was conducted to assess 
the extent to which business models react differently to Basel III announcements. Six press 
release dates were selected, each date with different developments in the designing of Basel 
III. This study found that the reactions to the announcements were not homogenous, some 
announcements resulted in positive abnormal returns while other announcements resulted in 
negative abnormal returns. What was surprising and not expected before conducting the study 
was the large number of positive abnormal returns in a number of events. These results could 
indicate that the market expects Basel III to help banks achieve higher returns in the long-
term. Another possibility could be that the market was expecting a stricter framework prior to 
the announcement.  
 Following the event study analysis, and to understand if the models identified in this 
thesis can be used to explain abnormal returns, a regression analysis is conducted. Apart from 
business models, the following control variables were used to build a robust regression mod-
el: market capitalization, return on assets, return on equity, and equity over assets. The R-
Squared values obtained from the regressions are relatively low, ranging from 0.009 to 0.21, 
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so it can be concluded that business models and the control variables have low explanatory 
power when explaining the abnormal returns. 
Summarizing the empirical results obtained for the events selected:  
Event 1 on the 30th of March 2009 expressed a desire by BCBS to improve and ex-
pand the Basel II framework. The new framework had the objective of increasing capital re-
quirements, include liquidity buffers and expand into non-regulated activities motivated by 
the financial crisis. From the statistical significant results in this event study, it could be con-
cluded that the value of Model 3 (T/NT) banks decreased in response to this announcement. 
Model 3 (T/NT) is a non-traditional model, so the result is in line with the expectation prior 
to conducting the study as non-traditional models would be expected to be negatively impact-
ed more than traditional models. From the regression, it was concluded that Model 3 (T/NT) 
and Model 4 (NT/NT) banks are expected to have lower abnormal returns than Model 1 (T/T) 
banks as a result of announcement 1. However, the larger event window predicts positive 
abnormal returns for Model 1 (T/T) and even higher for Model 4 (NT/NT) banks. 
Event 2 on the 17th of December 2009 provided more details into Basel III by issuing 
the first consultative documents that were to become the new Basel III framework. The statis-
tically results suggest that the market expected lower future returns for the aggregate of banks 
in the sample and in particular for Model 1(T/T) banks after this announcement. The regres-
sion analysis also predicted negative abnormal returns for Model 1 (T/T) banks and Model 2 
(NT/T) are expected to have higher abnormal returns than Model 1 (T/T) banks. The market 
seemed to be penalizing the traditional Model 1 (T/T) banks. 
Event 3 on the 16th of July 2010 announced general progress in the regulatory reform 
package and introduced the countercyclical capital buffer. The statistically significant results 
showed positive abnormal returns after this announcement, the largest increase was in Model 
1 (T/T) and Model 2 (NT/T) banks. Both models have a traditional liability structure, so the 
market could be rewarding this characteristic. There is a possibility that the market sees the 
countercyclical capital buffer a measure that will improve the bank’s bottom line in the long-
term. The regressions predicted positive abnormal returns for Model 1(T/T) banks. 
Event 4 on the 26th of July 2010 the BCBS announced that it reached a broad agree-
ment on the capital and liquidity reform package. The event study conducted has four statisti-
cally significant results. The aggregate of banks in the sample, Model 2 (NT/T) and Model 3 
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(T/NT) have positive and statistically significant results. Model 2 (NT/T) had the highest sta-
tistically significant abnormal returns. These results suggest that the market is rewarding li-
quidity regulation introduced by Basel III, benefiting Model 2 (NT/T) banks the most. On the 
regressions model, the results are similar than the event study. Model 1 (T/T) banks expected 
to have positive abnormal returns and Model 2 (NT/T) banks are expected to have higher 
abnormal returns than Model 1(T/T) banks.  
Event 5 on the 12th of September of 2010, the BCBS announced higher capital re-
quirements and provided a phase-in schedule for the implementation of Basel III. The event 
study conducted had one statistically significant result of 2.24 for Model 3 (T/NT) on win-
dow [0]. The lack of statistically significant results in this announcement could be explained 
by the possibility that the market was already expecting this information, so the announce-
ment had no effect. The regression model showed an expected positive abnormal return for 
Model 1 (T/T) banks and Model 3 (T/NT) is expected to have higher abnormal returns than 
Model 1 (T/T) banks. A possible explanation for this result is that the market could be re-
warding the fact that the implementation will be phased-in giving more time for banks to pre-
pare their compliance efforts. 
Event 6 on the 16th of December 2010 represented the full documents of Basel III. 
The event study conducted had two statistically significant negative results in window [-3,+3] 
for the aggregate of banks in the sample and for Model 2 (NT/T) banks. The low level of sta-
tistically significant results in window [0] could mean that the market already knew what to 
expect form Basel III reform, so the announcement did not provide a large amount of new 
information. However the statistically significant results in the larger window could mean 
that the market perceived the final version of Basel III to negatively impact banks and Model 
2 (NT/T) banks the most. Model 2 (NT/T) has a non-traditional asset structure so the market 
could be penalizing this characteristic.  
The results show that there was not a homogenous response to Basel III and therefore 
it is not possible to predict what was the overall market response to Basel III. However, the 
event study did show some patterns. Some banks react more prominently than others to some 
announcements, but this could be due to factors other than business models, as the regression 
R-Squared results had low explanatory power. It was clear that business models cannot be 
taken in isolation to predict the effects of Basel III as there are more dynamics at play that 
could influence the value of exchange traded European banks.  
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Answering the question posed in the introduction: Did Basel announcement had nega-
tive impact on firm value of European banks? And did Basel III benefited some models more 
than others?  The answer is inconclusive for both questions because the results were not con-
sistent in all the events analyzed. The first event and the last event have 626 days apart from 
each other, a great deal of expectations and adaptations to Basel III occurred during this peri-
od, this could be an explanation for the results not being homogenous among event dates 
which made the results harder to interpret.  
5.1 – Limitations 
!
There were a number of limitations to this study that will be listed here. First, when 
conducting an event study confounding effects can be present especially on the longer event 
windows. This can distort the cumulative abnormal returns which will make the subsequent 
tests not valid as they do not capture the event under study. Second, the events selected have 
several developments, so it can be hard to exactly identify which part of the announcement 
caused the reaction. Third, there are several methods for identifying and assigning business 
models. Only one method was used in this study due to time constraints, however using more 
methods can benefit a study that focuses on bank business models. Fourth, the sample was 
comprised only of exchange traded banks and it was limited to data availability narrowing 
down the sample to a relatively low number of banks. Fifth, this study suffers from survivor-
ship bias. The sample of banks in the database only included banks that were operating as of 
2017. And sixth, the measures for the control variables in the regression for profitability, size 
and capitalization level were somewhat crude, better data could provide better metrics for 
these variables.!
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 - Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 
!
Basel I capital requirements weights (BCBS, 1988) 
Risk weights by category of on-balance-sheet asset 
0% 
(a) Cash 
(b) Claims on central governments and central banks denominated in national currency and funded in that currency 
(c) Other claims on OECD central governments and central banks 
(d) Claims collateralised by cash of OECD central government securities or guaranteed by OECD central governments 
0, 10, 20, or 50% (at national discretion) 
(a) Claims on domestic public sector entities excluding central government and loans guaranteed by such entities 
20% 
(a) Claims on multilateral development banks (IBRD  IADB  AsDB  AfDB  EIB) and claims guaranteed by or collateralised by securities issued by such banks 
(b) Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and loans guaranteed by OECD incorporated banks 
(c) 
Claims on banks incorporated in countries outside the OECD with a residual 
maturity of up to one year and loans with a residual maturity of up to one year 
guaranteed by banks incorporated in countries outside the OECD 
(d) Claims on non-domestic OECD public-sector entities excluding central government and loans guaranteed by such entities 
(e) Cash items in process of collection 
50% 
(a) Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property that is or will be occupied by the borrower or that is rented 
100% 
(a) Claims on the private sector 
(b) Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual maturity of over one year 
(c) Claims on central governments outside the OECD (unless denominated in national currency - and funded in that currency - see above) 
(d) Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector 
(e) Premises plant and equipment and other fixed assets 
(f) Real estate and other investments (including non-consolidated investment participations in other companies) 
(g) Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless deducted from capital) 
(h) all other assets 
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!
Pillar 2 Supervisory review key principles (BCBS, 2004) 
Principle 1 
Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital 
adequacy in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for maintain-
ing their capital levels. 
 
Principle 2 
Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital 
adequacy assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to 
monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory capital ratios. 
Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they are 
not satisfied with the result of this process. 
Principle 3: Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the 
minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to 
require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum. 
 
Principle 3 
Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum 
regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks 
to hold capital in excess of the minimum. 
 
Principle 4 
Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent 
capital from falling below the minimum levels required to support 
the risk characteristics of a particular bank and should require rapid 
remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored 
 
Phase-in arrangements Basel III (BCBS 2010) 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Leverag ratio Supervisory monitoring 
Parallel run 1 Jan 
2013 – 1 Jan 2017. 
Disclosure starts 1 
Jan 2015 
 Migration to Pillar 1  
Minimum common equity 
capital ratio   3.5% 4% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
Capital conservation buffer      0.625% 1.25% 1.875% 2.5% 
Minimum common equity 
plus capital conservation 
buffer 
  2.5% 4% 4.5% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7% 
Phase in of deductions 
from CET1 (including 
amounts exceeding the 
limit for STAs, MSRs and 
financials) 
   20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100% 
Minimum Tier 1 Capital   4.5% 5.5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Minimum Total Capital   8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
Minimum Total Capital 
plus conservation buffer   8% 8% 8% 8.625% 9.25% 9.875% 10.5% 
Capital instruments that no 
longer qualify as non-core 
Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 
capital 
  
Phased out over 
10 year horizon 
beginning 2013 
 
Liquidity coverage ratio Observation period begins    
Introduce 
minimum 
standard 
    
Net stable funding ratio  Observation period begins      
Introduce 
minimum 
standard 
 
 
 
  
:#!
!
Appendix 2 - Business Models 
!
Bank Business Model list 2010 obtained by running k-means clustering algorithm: 
RIC CODE Bank Name Business 
Model 
1VUB02AE.BV Vseobecna Uverova Banka as Model 1 
4CF.BB Central Cooperative Bank AD Model 1 
5BN.BB Bulgarian American Credit Bank AD Model 3 
5F4.BB First Investment Bank AD Model 1 
ACBr.AT Alpha Bank SA Model 1 
AIKB.BEL Agroindustrijsko Komercijalna Banka Aik Banka ad Beograd Model 1 
AKTRV.HE Aktia Bank Abp Model 3 
ALBAV.HE Alandsbanken Abp Model 1 
ALBK.I Allied Irish Banks PLC Model 1 
AMBr.AT T Bank SA Model 1 
ARLG.DE Aareal Bank AG Model 1 
BAER.S Julius Baer Gruppe AG Model 2 
BAMI.MI Banco Bpm SpA Model 3 
BARC.L Barclays PLC Model 2 
BAVL.PFT Raiffeisen Bank Aval' PAT Model 1 
BBPI.LS Banco Bpi SA Model 1 
BBVA.MC Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Model 1 
BC.S Bank Coop AG Model 1 
BCGE.S Banque Cantonale de Geneve Model 2 
BCJ.S Banque Cantonale du Jura SA Model 1 
BCP.LS Banco Comercial Portugues SA Model 1 
BCVN.S Banque Cantonale Vaudoise Model 3 
BEKN.S Berner Kantonalbank AG Model 1 
BFE.MI Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA Model 2 
BGN.MI Banca Generali SpA Model 2 
BHW.WA Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA Model 2 
BIM.MI Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni SpA Model 1 
BKIR.I Bank of Ireland Model 1 
BKOM.PR Komercni Banka as Model 1 
BKT.MC Bankinter SA Model 3 
BLKB.S Basellandschaftliche Kantonalbank Model 1 
BMPS.MI Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Model 3 
BNAB.BR National Bank of Belgium Model 3 
BNORDIK.CO BankNordik P/F Model 1 
BNPP.PA BNP Paribas SA Model 2 
BOAr.AT Attica Bank SA Model 1 
BOGr.AT Bank of Greece Model 3 
BOPr.AT Piraeus Bank SA Model 1 
BOSP.WA Bank Ochrony Srodowiska SA Model 1 
BOV.MT Bank of Valletta PLC Model 1 
BPSI.MI Banca Popolare di Sondrio ScpA Model 1 
BPSP.MI Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA Model 1 
BSKP.S Basler Kantonalbank Model 1 
BSPB.MM Bank Sankt-Peterburg PAO Model 1 
BZW.WA Bank Zachodni WBK SA Model 1 
CABK.MC Caixabank SA Model 2 
CADNi.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel de Nord de France SC Model 1 
CAGR.PA Credit Agricole SA Model 3 
CAHM.MC Fundacion Caja Mediterraneo Model 2 
CAIF.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel de Paris et d'Ile de 
France 
Model 1 
CALCi.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Atlantique Vendee SC Model 1 
CAT31.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Toulouse 31 SC Model 1 
CBKG.DE Commerzbank AG Model 3 
CBRO.L Close Brothers Group PLC Model 3 
CC.PA Credit Industriel et Commercial SA Model 2 
CCNP.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel de Normandie Seine 
SC 
Model 1 
CDBG.DE Comdirect Bank AG Model 2 
CIV.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel d'Ille-et-Vilaine SC Model 1 
CMO.PA Credit Agricole du Morbihan SC Model 1 
CRAP.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Alpes Provence Model 1 
CRBP2.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Brie Picardie Model 1 
CRDI.MI UniCredit SpA Model 1 
CRGI.MI Banca Carige SpA Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia Model 3 
CRLA.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel du Languedoc SC Model 1 
CRLO.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Loire Haute-Loire Model 1 
CRSU.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Sud Rhone Alpes Model 1 
CRTO.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel de la Touraine et du 
Poitou SCACV 
Model 1 
CSGN.S Credit Suisse Group AG Model 2 
DANSKE.CO Danske Bank A/S Model 3 
DBKGn.DE Deutsche Bank AG Model 2 
DESI.MI Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA Model 3 
DEXI.BR Dexia SA Model 3 
DJUR.CO Djurslands Bank A/S Model 1 
:C!
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DNB.OL DNB ASA Model 3 
DVBG.F Dvb Bank SE Model 3 
EFGN.S EFG International AG Model 2 
EMBI.MI Credito Emiliano SpA Model 1 
EMII.MI Bper Banca SpA Model 3 
ERST.VI Erste Group Bank AG Model 1 
EURBr.AT Eurobank Ergasias SA Model 1 
FHBK.BU FHB Jelzalogbank Nyrt Model 3 
GPSr.AT TT Hellenic Postbank SA Model 2 
GRKP.S Graubuendner Kantonalbank Model 1 
GTN.WA Getin Holding SA Model 1 
HBLN.S Hypothekarbank Lenzburg AG Model 1 
HBNK.CY Hellenic Bank PCL Model 1 
HELG.OL Helgeland Sparebank Model 3 
HSB.MT HSBC Bank Malta PLC Model 3 
HSBA.L HSBC Holdings PLC Model 2 
HVID.CO Hvidbjerg Bank A/S Model 1 
IKBZ.SJ ASA Banka dd Sarajevo Model 2 
IL0A.I Permanent TSB Group Holdings PLC Model 2 
INGA.AS ING Groep NV Model 3 
INGP.WA ING Bank Slaski SA Model 1 
ISP.MI Intesa Sanpaolo SpA Model 3 
JMBN.BEL Jubmes Banka ad Beograd Model 2 
JUTBK.CO Jutlander Bank A/S Model 1 
JYSK.CO Jyske Bank A/S Model 1 
KASNc.AS KAS Bank NV Model 2 
KBC.BR KBC Groep NV Model 2 
KMB.MKE Komercijalna Banka AD Skopje Model 1 
KMBN.BEL Komercijalna Banka ad Beograd Model 1 
LLOY.L Lloyds Banking Group PLC Model 3 
LOCI.PA Locindus SA Model 4 
LOLB.CO Lollands Bank A/S Model 1 
LUKN.S Luzerner Kantonalbank AG Model 1 
LUXORb.CO Investeringsselskabet Luxor A/S Model 4 
MDBI.MI Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario SpA Model 3 
MILP.WA Bank Millennium SA Model 1 
MING.OL Sparebank 1 SMN Model 3 
MNBA.CO Moens Bank A/S Model 1 
NBGr.AT National Bank of Greece SA Model 1 
NDA.ST Nordea Bank AB Model 3 
NONG.OL Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge Model 1 
NORDJB.CO Nordjyske Bank A/S Model 1 
OJBA.CO Oestjydsk Bank A/S Model 1 
OLBG.F Oldenburgische Landesbank AG Model 1 
OTPB.BU OTP Bank Nyrt Model 1 
PBZ.ZA Privredna Banka Zagreb dd Model 1 
PCVI.MI Banca Piccolo Credito Valtellinese SpA Model 1 
PEO.WA Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA Model 1 
PKO.WA Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski SA Model 1 
POP.MC Banco Popular Espanol SA Model 1 
PRO.MI Banca Profilo SpA Model 2 
QB7G.DE Quirin Bank AG Model 1 
RBIV.VI Raiffeisen Bank International AG Model 1 
RBS.L Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC Model 2 
RILBA.CO Ringkjoebing Landbobank A/S Model 1 
RLD.S Edmond de Rothschild Suisse SA Model 1 
ROBCC.BX Banca Comerciala Carpatica SA Model 2 
ROBRD.BX BRD Groupe Societe Generale SA Model 1 
ROSB.MM Rosbank PAO Model 1 
ROTLV.BX Banca Transilvania SA Model 1 
SAB1L.VL Siauliu Bankas AB Model 1 
SABE.MC Banco de Sabadell SA Model 1 
SADG.OL Sandnes Sparebank Model 3 
SAN.MC Banco Santander SA Model 1 
SARIn.MI Banco di Sardegna SpA Model 1 
SBER.MM Sberbank Rossii PAO Model 1 
SBT.MKE Stopanska Banka AD Bitola Model 2 
SEBa.ST Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Model 3 
SGKN.S St Galler Kantonalbank AG Model 1 
SHBa.ST Svenska Handelsbanken AB Model 3 
SKJE.CO Skjern Bank A/S Model 1 
SKUE.OL Skue Sparebank Model 1 
SNBN.S Schweizerische Nationalbank Model 3 
SOGN.PA Societe Generale SA Model 2 
SPMO.OL Sparebanken More Model 1 
SPNO.CO Spar Nord Bank A/S Model 1 
SPOG.OL Sparebanken Ost Model 3 
SRBANK.OL Sparebank 1 SR Bank ASA Model 3 
STAN.L Standard Chartered PLC Model 1 
SVEG.OL Sparebanken Vest Model 3 
SWEDa.ST Swedbank AB Model 3 
SYDB.CO Sydbank A/S Model 1 
TOTA.CO Totalbanken A/S Model 1 
TOTG.OL Totens Sparebank Model 3 
TUBG.D HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG Model 2 
UBI.MI Unione di Banche Italiane SpA Model 3 
USCB.PFT Ukrsotsbank PAT Model 1 
:J!
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VATN.S Valiant Holding AG Model 1 
VG8G.DE Varengold Bank AG Model 4 
VJBA.CO Vestjysk Bank A/S Model 3 
VLAN.AS Van Lanschot NV Model 3 
VPBN.S VP Bank AG Model 2 
VTBR.MM Bank VTB PAO Model 1 
VZRZ.MM Vozrozhdenie Bank Model 1 
WKB.S Banque Cantonale du Valais Model 1 
WPBI.VI Wiener Privatbank SE Model 1 
ZBB.ZA Zagrebacka Banka dd Model 1 
ZG.S Zuger Kantonalbank Model 1 
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Bank Business Model list 2009 obtained by running k-means clustering algorithm: 
RIC Code Bank Name 
Business 
model 
ARLG.DE Aareal Bank AG Model 1 
AIKB.BEL Agroindustrijsko Komercijalna Banka Aik Banka ad Beograd Model 3 
ALBAV.HE Alandsbanken Abp Model 3 
ALBK.I Allied Irish Banks PLC Model 1 
ACBr.AT Alpha Bank SA Model 1 
IKBZ.SJ ASA Banka dd Sarajevo Model 3 
BOAr.AT Attica Bank SA Model 1 
CRGI.MI Banca Carige SpA Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia Model 2 
ROBCC.BX Banca Comerciala Carpatica SA Model 2 
BFE.MI Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA Model 2 
BGN.MI Banca Generali SpA Model 1 
BIM.MI Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni SpA Model 1 
BMED.MI Banca Mediolanum SpA Model 1 
BMPS.MI Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Model 3 
PCVI.MI Banca Piccolo Credito Valtellinese SpA Model 1 
BPSI.MI Banca Popolare di Sondrio ScpA Model 3 
BPSP.MI Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA Model 2 
PRO.MI Banca Profilo SpA Model 1 
ROTLV.BX Banca Transilvania SA Model 3 
BBVA.MC Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Model 3 
BBPI.LS Banco Bpi SA Model 3 
BAMI.MI Banco Bpm SpA Model 3 
BCP.LS Banco Comercial Portugues SA Model 3 
SABE.MC Banco de Sabadell SA Model 3 
DESI.MI Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA Model 3 
SARIn.MI Banco di Sardegna SpA Model 3 
POP.MC Banco Popular Espanol SA Model 3 
SAN.MC Banco Santander SA Model 1 
BC.S Bank Coop AG Model 2 
BHW.WA Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA Model 1 
MILP.WA Bank Millennium SA Model 1 
BOSP.WA Bank Ochrony Srodowiska SA Model 3 
BOGr.AT Bank of Greece Model 3 
BKIR.I Bank of Ireland Model 1 
BOV.MT Bank of Valletta PLC Model 3 
PEO.WA Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA Model 3 
BSPB.MM Bank Sankt-Peterburg PAO Model 2 
VTBR.MM Bank VTB PAO Model 1 
BZW.WA Bank Zachodni WBK SA Model 1 
BKT.MC Bankinter SA Model 2 
BNORDIK.CO BankNordik P/F Model 1 
BCGE.S Banque Cantonale de Geneve Model 1 
BCJ.S Banque Cantonale du Jura SA Model 1 
WKB.S Banque Cantonale du Valais Model 2 
BCVN.S Banque Cantonale Vaudoise Model 1 
BARC.L Barclays PLC Model 3 
BLKB.S Basellandschaftliche Kantonalbank Model 1 
BSKP.S Basler Kantonalbank Model 1 
BEKN.S Berner Kantonalbank AG Model 2 
BNPP.PA BNP Paribas SA Model 3 
EMII.MI Bper Banca SpA Model 3 
ROBRD.BX BRD Groupe Societe Generale SA Model 2 
5BN.BB Bulgarian American Credit Bank AD Model 1 
CRAP.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Alpes Provence Model 3 
CALCi.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Atlantique Vendee SC Model 1 
CRBP2.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Brie Picardie Model 1 
CIV.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel d'Ille-et-Vilaine SC Model 3 
CRTO.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel de la Touraine et du Poitou SCACV Model 1 
CADNi.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel de Nord de France SC Model 1 
CCNP.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel de Normandie Seine SC Model 1 
CAIF.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel de Paris et d'Ile de France Model 1 
CRLA.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel du Languedoc SC Model 1 
CRLO.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Loire Haute-Loire Model 1 
CRSU.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Sud Rhone Alpes Model 1 
CAT31.PA Caisse Regionale de Credit Agricole Mutuel Toulouse 31 SC Model 1 
CABK.MC Caixabank SA Model 1 
4CF.BB Central Cooperative Bank AD Model 1 
CBRO.L Close Brothers Group PLC Model 1 
CDBG.DE Comdirect Bank AG Model 3 
CBKG.DE Commerzbank AG Model 2 
CMO.PA Credit Agricole du Morbihan SC Model 1 
CAGR.PA Credit Agricole SA Model 3 
CC.PA Credit Industriel et Commercial SA Model 3 
CSGN.S Credit Suisse Group AG Model 2 
EMBI.MI Credito Emiliano SpA Model 2 
DANSKE.CO Danske Bank A/S Model 3 
DBKGn.DE Deutsche Bank AG Model 2 
DEXI.BR Dexia SA Model 3 
DJUR.CO Djurslands Bank A/S Model 1 
:.!
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DNB.OL DNB ASA Model 1 
DVBG.F Dvb Bank SE Model 3 
RLD.S Edmond de Rothschild Suisse SA Model 1 
EFGN.S EFG International AG Model 3 
ERST.VI Erste Group Bank AG Model 2 
EURBr.AT Eurobank Ergasias SA Model 3 
FHBK.BU FHB Jelzalogbank Nyrt Model 1 
5F4.BB First Investment Bank AD Model 4 
CAHM.MC Fundacion Caja Mediterraneo Model 2 
GTN.WA Getin Holding SA Model 1 
GRKP.S Graubuendner Kantonalbank Model 1 
HELG.OL Helgeland Sparebank Model 1 
HBNK.CY Hellenic Bank PCL Model 1 
HSB.MT HSBC Bank Malta PLC Model 1 
HSBA.L HSBC Holdings PLC Model 1 
TUBG.D HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG Model 3 
HVID.CO Hvidbjerg Bank A/S Model 2 
HBLN.S Hypothekarbank Lenzburg AG Model 2 
INGP.WA ING Bank Slaski SA Model 1 
INGA.AS ING Groep NV Model 3 
ISP.MI Intesa Sanpaolo SpA Model 3 
LUXORb.CO Investeringsselskabet Luxor A/S Model 1 
JMBN.BEL Jubmes Banka ad Beograd Model 3 
JUTBK.CO Jutlander Bank A/S Model 2 
JYSK.CO Jyske Bank A/S Model 2 
KASNc.AS KAS Bank NV Model 1 
KBC.BR KBC Groep NV Model 3 
KMBN.BEL Komercijalna Banka ad Beograd Model 2 
KMB.MKE Komercijalna Banka AD Skopje Model 2 
BKOM.PR Komercni Banka as Model 1 
LLOY.L Lloyds Banking Group PLC Model 1 
LOCI.PA Locindus SA Model 3 
LOLB.CO Lollands Bank A/S Model 1 
LUKN.S Luzerner Kantonalbank AG Model 1 
MBK.WA MBANK Model 1 
MDBI.MI Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario SpA Model 3 
MNBA.CO Moens Bank A/S Model 1 
BNAB.BR National Bank of Belgium Model 4 
NBGr.AT National Bank of Greece SA Model 1 
NDA.ST Nordea Bank AB Model 4 
NORDJB.CO Nordjyske Bank A/S Model 1 
OJBA.CO Oestjydsk Bank A/S Model 1 
OLBG.F Oldenburgische Landesbank AG Model 1 
OTPB.BU OTP Bank Nyrt Model 3 
IL0A.I Permanent TSB Group Holdings PLC Model 1 
BOPr.AT Piraeus Bank SA Model 1 
PKO.WA Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski SA Model 3 
PBZ.ZA Privredna Banka Zagreb dd Model 1 
QB7G.DE Quirin Bank AG Model 1 
BAVL.PFT Raiffeisen Bank Aval' PAT Model 1 
RBIV.VI Raiffeisen Bank International AG Model 1 
RILBA.CO Ringkjoebing Landbobank A/S Model 1 
ROSB.MM Rosbank PAO Model 1 
RBS.L Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC Model 1 
SADG.OL Sandnes Sparebank Model 1 
SBER.MM Sberbank Rossii PAO Model 2 
SNBN.S Schweizerische Nationalbank Model 3 
SAB1L.VL Siauliu Bankas AB Model 1 
SEBa.ST Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Model 3 
SKJE.CO Skjern Bank A/S Model 1 
SKUE.OL Skue Sparebank Model 3 
SOGN.PA Societe Generale SA Model 1 
SPNO.CO Spar Nord Bank A/S Model 1 
NONG.OL Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge Model 3 
MING.OL Sparebank 1 SMN Model 1 
SRBANK.OL Sparebank 1 SR Bank ASA Model 3 
SPMO.OL Sparebanken More Model 3 
SPOG.OL Sparebanken Ost Model 3 
SVEG.OL Sparebanken Vest Model 1 
SGKN.S St Galler Kantonalbank AG Model 3 
STAN.L Standard Chartered PLC Model 3 
SBT.MKE Stopanska Banka AD Bitola Model 3 
SHBa.ST Svenska Handelsbanken AB Model 2 
SWEDa.ST Swedbank AB Model 2 
SYDB.CO Sydbank A/S Model 3 
AMBr.AT T Bank SA Model 3 
TOTA.CO Totalbanken A/S Model 1 
TOTG.OL Totens Sparebank Model 1 
GPSr.AT TT Hellenic Postbank SA Model 1 
USCB.PFT Ukrsotsbank PAT Model 3 
CRDI.MI UniCredit SpA Model 2 
UBI.MI Unione di Banche Italiane SpA Model 1 
VATN.S Valiant Holding AG Model 3 
VLAN.AS Van Lanschot NV Model 3 
VG8G.DE Varengold Bank AG Model 3 
VJBA.CO Vestjysk Bank A/S Model 1 
VZRZ.MM Vozrozhdenie Bank Model 3 
::!
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VPBN.S VP Bank AG Model 3 
1VUB02AE.BV Vseobecna Uverova Banka as Model 1 
WPBI.VI Wiener Privatbank SE Model 2 
ZBB.ZA Zagrebacka Banka dd Model 1 
ZG.S Zuger Kantonalbank Model 1 
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Appendix 3 – Univariate analysis 
!
OLS univariate regressions of AR and CARs with all independent variables excluding business models 
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Appendix 4 - Descriptive statistics ARs and CARs 
 
Descriptive statistics 30 Mar 2009 
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Descriptive statistics ROE and ROA by business model in 2010. Values are in % 
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Appendix 5 – Summary of statistically significant results in event 
study and in the regression model with business models 
!
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